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ABSTRACT 
 
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL THOUGHT OF BEDİÜZZAMAN SAİD-İ KÜRDİ 
 
 
 
Esat Arslan 
M.A., History 
Supervisor: Selçuk Akşin Somel 
June 2004, xi+105 pages 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to present the formulation of ethical realm in the thought 
of Bediüzzaman Said-i Kürdi (1876-1960). Throughout a depiction of the idea in the Classical 
Age of Islam, and depicting that in this age ethical domain was determined by metaphysics, 
the Scripture and political concerns it is claimed that the alienation of the Islamic World from 
the spirit of Islam through the modernization process, new inclinations emerged to internalize 
the modernist social mentality on one hand and adoption of the Islamic legal understanding 
into modern conditions on the other. Bediüzzaman is claimed to have synthesized these two 
trends within the framework of 19th century Sufi approaches to ideal notions of society. 
Through Sufism, Bediüzzaman reevaluated the the Enlightenment ideals on the assumption of 
man’s true existence in the world as a caliph of God, and had reached a modern social 
thought. Through this social thought, he developed a new interpretation of Islamic law which 
based itself upon reason and assumed freedom as a telos.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
BEDİÜZZAMAN SAİD-İ KÜRDİ’NİN TOPLUM VE ETİK DÜŞÜNCESİ 
 
Esat Arslan 
 
Tarih Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
Haziran 2004, xi+105 sayfa 
 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı Bediüzzaman Said-i Kürdi’nin (1876-1960) düşüncesinde etik 
alanın formülasyonunu sunmaktır. Bu fikrin İslam’ın klasik çağındaki görünümünü 
resmederek, ve bu çağda etik alanın metafizik, Kutsal Metin ve politik kaygılarla 
şekillendiğini sunarak iddia edilmiştir ki İslam Dünyası’nın modernleşme süreciyle İslam’ın 
ruhuna yabancılaşması, bir yandan modernist toplum zihniyetini içselleştiren ve öte yandan 
İslam hukuku algılamasını modern koşullara uyarlayan eğilimler ortaya çıktı. Bu iki akımın 
Bediüzzaman tarafından 19. yüzyıl ideal toplum kavramsallaştırılması olarak Sufi 
yaklaşımlarının sunduğu parametreler içerisinde sentezlendiği iddia edildi. Sufizm yoluyla 
Bediüzzaman, Aydınlanma ideallerini insanın dünyadaki gerçek varoluşu olan Allah’ın 
halifeliği konumu varsayımıyla yeniden değerlendirerek modern bir sosyal düşünceye 
ulaşmıştır.Bu sosyal düşünceyle o, akla dayanan ve hedefi özgürlük olan bir İslam hukuku 
yorumuna varmıştır.        
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
In this study, Turkish names as well as general Islamic concepts appear according to 
the Turkish orthography. The names that are widely being used in the international academic 
discourse, mainly the prominent figures of the Classical Islam, are written according to the 
international usage.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Second Constitutional period (1908-1909) witnessed a series of significant cultural 
developments in the Ottoman history. New intellectual approaches concerning social issues 
emerged in this era, and affected profoundly the course of historical developments including 
those of contemporary Turkey. The Turkish intellectual has always been aware of the crucial 
importance of that age and those intellectual trends that prepared this period; therefore numerous 
studies have been done on this subject.  
However, there exists a significant bias among present-day academicians in the 
motivation on the selected subject-matter: the era is studied depending on its effect on modern 
Turkey’s ruling elite. The Young Ottomans and the Young Turks are considered to be significant 
mainly due to their significance as a preparation to Kemalism. Even though, it seems to be that 
this bias has been softened and other significant trends and dimensions within these intellectual 
generations are being explored, a peculiar intellectual trend of the epoch has not yet been fully 
comprehended: the 2nd Constitutional Islamists. Apart from the critical approaches of Tarık Zafer 
Tunaya1 and İsmail Kara,2 and Selçuk Akşin Somel it seems to be that this movement has been 
rather neglected, probably due to its failure in the intellectual-political struggle. These authors 
seem to regard the Islamists as a side effect of the Turkish modernization process, who were 
‘naturally’ bound to fail. Even though the political positions of Tarık Zafer Tunaya and İsmail 
Kara are quite different, it seems that neither of them grasped certain crucial aspects of 2nd 
Constitutional Islamism.  
The Islamists were the first generation to confront different aspects of modern mentality 
by applying a sound Islamic knowledge. The Young Ottomans cannot reach their deepness of 
Islamic knowledge even though the Young Ottomans were the ones who started the Islamization 
of modernity. In this aspect, they on one hand form the true evolution of the Young Ottoman 
cause, and set on the otherhand the possible horizons for Muslim encounter with modernity. 
                                                 
1 Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. İslamcılık Akımı, (İstanbul: Simavi Yayınları, 1991.) 
2Kara, İsmail. İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri. (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1994.) 
  
Their failure was not essential but contingent upon their lacking of social support. The common 
people were not aware of the true significance of modernity, and the political elite had already 
been mentally secularized. What is significant is that a century later the in-origin-peripheral 
political formation, AKP, seems to repeat what the Islamists had said before. There may be no 
historical link between them, but the question is the same: how can one live Islam in the modern 
age? The Islamist spectrum, ranging from the proto-fundamentalist Said Halim Paşa to the 
complete-promoter-of-cultural-dialogue Bediüzzaman Said-i Kürdi delineates a variety of 
possible Muslim approaches to a desirable Islamic modernity. My thesis is a study on 
Bediüzzaman in that respect.  
Recent decades have experienced an increasing interest in the legacy of Bediüzzaman 
Said-i Kürdi (1876-1960). His attempt in introducing modern life to the Muslim worldview has 
been mostly highlighted. Academic researches have focused on the works of his metaphysical 
phase; i.e. the Republican years (1923-1960). However, his contribution to the internalization of 
socio-theoretical aspects of modernity which was revealed after the 2nd Constitution (1908-1923) 
is completely neglected. My thesis tries to fill this gap. In other words, my study, which deals 
with his socio-theoretical phase (1908-1923) tries to complete the picture of Bediüzzaman’s 
metaphysical project and show the socio-political extension of his metaphysics. Without an 
understanding of Kürdi’s social project the understanding of the Nurju cause in society would 
inevitably collapse. The social theory behind the movement’s action, their understanding of the 
şeriat, and the ideal religious society that they try to attain are all derived from the metaphysical 
dimension of Bediüzzaman’s writings but manifested in his socio-theoretical phase. For example, 
the Abant Meetings of Fethullah Gülen community may be regarded as a strategic political 
maneuver of the community in their effort to take the consent of intellectuals from different 
segments of society. However, more than the considerations on strategies, social dialogue 
between all groups of the society is essentially embedded in Bediüzzaman’s social theory: it is 
not an issue of power, but religious norm.      
 The novelty of Bediüzzaman in Islamic social thinking is that, his ethics is derived from 
social thought, but not from theology or the Şeriat. This implies that ethics is a product of social 
rationality, and has its own rules, prior to the understanding of the Islamic law. The şeriat begins 
to function only after the domain of social reality finishes its work. This situation brings an 
autonomy to the ethical realm. Compared with the dominant worldview of the classical ages of 
 2 
Islam, this is a complete breakthrough. This autonomy, through creating a dialogue between 
different groups in society, and by this, creating an understanding of citizenship and secularism 
sensitive to the Transcendental, is a completely ‘modern’ democratic phenomenon. The scholar 
of the classical age, in contrast, would have suggested that ethics as something what God orders 
and nothing else, and say ‘this can only be found in the Scripture.’  
 Then, my presentation should comprise certain elements. First of all, one should be aware 
of the situation of ethics in the classical age of Islam. This is the first chapter of my thesis. In this 
chapter, I present the categorical and influential alternative approaches to the question of ethics 
with regard to metaphysics, the şeriat, and political thought. Through this, I will show possible 
influences on Kürdi, as well as the outcome of this epoch: the triumph of Ash-Shafii, Al-Ghazzali 
and Al-Ashari, all of whom agree on the arbitrariness of God’s orders. In an age of the lack of 
alienation from the spirit of the Revelation, this did not a constitute a problem. This chapter does 
not deal with the issue on its own, thus a selected second literature will be used.  
However, entrance of modernity into the Islamic world in the 19th century necessitated a 
search for rationality in God’s order. This is the topic of the second chapter. In this chapter, I 
shall try to trace the question of how Kürdi became able to base Islamic ethics on social theory. 
This chapter, thus, discusses 19th century modern Muslim intellectuals. Islamic world, during the 
19th century, developed a new understanding of Islamic law. The Ottoman intellectual, in his 
attempt to save the Empire, grasped modernity as material progress, democracy or a mentality all 
of which shaped Kürdi’s intellectual formation, but with a significant difference: Kürdi’s cause 
was to establish the ethical foundations of a future Islamic civilization, not to save the Empire 
itself. In this chapter, I will also deal with how Kürdi’s socialization in a Sufi environment led to 
his dependence on social theory.  
 Third chapter formulates Kürdi’s social theory vis-a-vis to the Enlightenment thought. I 
did so because, even though there does not seem to be a concrete direct impact of the 
Enlightenment over Kürdi, he seems to have grasped the basic tenets of it. My understanding of 
the form of this interaction is as follows: it was a positivistic process in the sense that he took the 
concept and put it in his theory directly. Rather, it was an hermeneutical interaction. 
Bediüzzaman, like any other Muslim intellectual of the age, observes the West, chooses the tenet 
or concept which he sees crucial, and embeds it into his theory through reevaluating it within the 
parameters of Islamic culture. The second aspect of this “translation,” i.e. entrance of Western 
 3 
concepts into the Islamic world, is related with Orientalism. Kürdi assumes cultural superiority of 
the West, and through transferring Western concepts, he tries to strenghten Islam against the 
West. In this chapter, I claim that Bediüzzaman’s social theory constitutes the idea of human 
being as a caliph God on Earth in the ‘modern’ age.  
 The last question is how this social theory shapes Bediüzzaman’s understanding of 
Islamic law, hence ethics. In the last chapter, I will present my formulation, and through a 
commentary on his içtihads, I will claim that he reached an understanding of a holistic, rational 
and  historicist Şeriat with a telos; a telos which is discovered by human reason and conscience: 
i.e. true freedom. In this aspect, I claim that Nurju groups do not have actual confrontation with 
the secular state as their understanding of ethics permit them to live in a secular formation of 
state.  
 However, this does not mean that Nurjuluk embraces secularism in toto. Rather, they 
suppose secular democracy as a stage which will be perfected (but not abandoned) by the 
application of the true şeriat when rational dialogue with segments of society create a consensus 
on this issue. As Kürdi’s disciple Fethullah Gülen utters in a speech: ‘democracy should serve 
also to the transcendental needs. Then, it becomes a true democracy.’3 
*** 
 In this study I limited myself with the works of Bediüzzaman that were written before 
1923. I made this limitation due to the fact that in the Republican era, Bediüzzaman chose a very 
conservative position in order to confront radical reformist project of Kemalism. His idea was 
that before a true revival in Islamic social thought the attack on religion should be stopped. This 
necessitated the conservation of Islam as it existed in the society. In numerous places he signifies 
that it will be the future generations that will restructure social and political life according to 
Islam. He also states that his socio-theoretical works of pre-Republican era will greatly serve in 
this later effort. Then we can say that even though there may seem inconsistencies in the 
statements of two subsequent phases, Republican propositions should be considered as 
conjunctural, and the 2nd Constitutional statements should be treated as the essence of 
Bediüzzaman’s social theory. In other words, my limitation does not impede a comprehensive 
view of Bediüzzaman’s social thought.       
                                                 
3 From an interview of Gülen by Nuriye Akman.  http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=roportaj&-
hn=29476 
 4 
 For this reason, the Republican Bediüzzaman is regarded in the academia as significant 
not because of his social thought but of his religious discourse that adapted the Muslim mentality 
into modern cosmology and mainly of the community bonds that Nurjuluk formed to fill the gap 
that secularist modernization process had created.4 Even though Mardin highlights these 
significant aspects of the Nurju movements, one point is lacking: the source of Nurju political 
consciousness and its general framework. Through expanding Mardin’s argument that 
Bediüzzaman was an agent of modernization within an Islamic perspective into his agency in the 
modernization process of the socio-political realm, I claim that the form of the existence of the 
Nurcu movements in the public realm in a modern way takes its roots from the teachings of 
Bediüzzaman of the 2nd Constitutional period. The most prominent example of this is the Gülen 
group’s call for tolerance and dialogue and creating a significant public space; i.e. Abant 
Meetings, including intellectuals from different segments of society. My claim is that rather than 
by his personal incentives, the motivation of Gülen is mainly shaped by Said-i Kürdi’s socio-
political teachings. For this reason, my study is an effort to fill the theoretical gap that is 
necessary to explain the social emergence of Nurjuluk. 
In this regard, my thesis can serve as a reevaluation of Nereid’s arguments.5 According to 
her, it is because Bediüzzaman was a threat to Republican nationalism that he was isolated by the 
state. She reaches to this argument by giving examples of certain tariqa-origin individuals being 
not a threat to nationalism, and so who were permitted by the state to take place in state affairs. 
My approach is that he was a real alternative to the secularist, may be more than nationalist, 
inclinations of the Republic due to his comprehensive evaluation and adoption of the 
Enlightenment values within an Islamic outlook, rather than within Kemalist positivism, so that a 
secularist state identity necessitated to suppress Bediüzzaman rather than manipulating him 
unlike other Islamic individuals who were unable to propose a solid Islamic reform program.    
        
                                                 
4 Mardin, Ş. Türkiye’de Din ve Toplumsal Değişme: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Olayı (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 1997) 
5 Nereid, C.T.  In the Light of Said Nursi: Turkish Nationalism and Religious Alternative 
(Bergen: Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1997) 
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 CHAPTER 1:  
 
THE HERITAGE OF THE CLASSICAL AGE 
 
 
 
 
This chapter inquires the general intellectual atmosphere of the Islam’s classical age to 
which Bediüzzaman Said-i Kürdi is responding to in his effort to create a rational social thought. 
My claim is that in the fields of metaphysics, holy law (şeriat) and political thought, classical 
Islamic thought prevented development of such a rationality. Furthermore, Kürdi, even though he 
possessed the main premises of this age, through a shift to a different a priori emphasis (social 
thought), was able to realize the existence of a rational sphere of ethics. That is to say, in 
Bediüzzaman, ethical reason determines the understanding of revelation and not vice versa. 
This chapter necessarily depends on secondary literature. Here I am to concentrate on the 
general atmosphere of the classical Islam, the alternative solutions to the question of ethics, in 
which routes they approached to ethics. My idea on the subject depends on a widely accepted 
proposition: for the sake of conserving the unity of Islamic community, the classical Islamic mind 
depended on God’s absolute volition, the word of the Scripture and the unquestioned authority of 
the ruler as bases for ethical thought.       
 
A. A GLO BAL OUTLOOK6 
The first legitimacy discussions related to the Islamic thought started after the 
assassination of the third caliph Othman and were completely political: who should be the leader 
of the Islamic community (ümmet)? Whereas the dominant attitude was conformism in order to 
protect the unity of ümmet, there were two radical answers as well: the Kharijites claimed 
equality of all Muslims in right to rule and secular nature of sovereignty. For them, even an 
anarchic society was possible. The second answer was provided by theShia; who claimed that the 
ones with special gift to understand the reality of revelation (hakikat) were the only legitimate 
rulers, namely the family of the Prophet.  
                                                 
6 The statements in this section will be elaborated and in the coming sections.  
 6 
As time passed, these groups became marginalized, and the ümmet compromised with the 
actual political situation: monarchy (the sultanate), even though, the religious legitimazition of 
the sultanate came much later. Apart from the question of polity, new problems emerged as a 
result of the conquests of the lands of different civilizations. New converts questioned the 
metaphysical nature of the revelation that conflicted with their heritages, and the schools of 
theology (kelam) were born as an answer to these questions. The main problematic areas were, 
the nature of God, His attributes, Divine will and human will, the role of reason in understanding 
truth and etc. The preliminary systematic thinking resulted in the triumph of al-Ash’ari, with a 
cost of losing the role of reason in understanding the Divine message. This triumph would also 
leave no room for the authonomy of ethics.    
In the magnificent ages of the Abbasids, Greek philosophy entered into the scene, and its 
representatives had a lot to say in all these problems. Figures like Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi were 
effective mostly on the elite’s thinking and very apt in metaphysical thought. Nevertheless, their 
cultural context enforced them also to compromise Greek philosophy with Islamic concepts. 
Even though they were in some way successful in this formulation, their problems with some 
significant dogmas of Islam created a reaction against them, whose personification was al-
Ghazzali. After his influence, philosophy found a place only in Sufism although there were some 
exceptions.  
Before philosophy entered Islamic discourse, legal thought had reached a systematic 
approach. The original free, prolific, anarchic and elastic legal thinking was systematized by ash-
Shafii whose fundamentals of law (usul-ü fıkıh) completely penetrated all schools of law. This 
phase reflected the end of creative process of lawmaking. After ash-Shafii, law became a matter 
of linguistic games unable to answer social changes. As there was no intellectual relationship 
with philosophy and legal thought, şeriat became merely a literal translation of the Scripture into 
life, not a total reflection of ethos into life. 
When a legitimacy crisis emerged due to the ad hoc political fragmentation of the ümmet 
due to the weakening of the Abbasids, practical and palliative responses did emerge. Unlike 
philosophers, political theologians, such as al-Ghazzali and al-Mawardi, had practical problems 
in mind. The main emphasis was on the preservation of the unity of ümmet. The cost was, again, 
the withdrawal of ethics from political life. The only possible legitimate action of the ruled was 
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obedience to authority. However, siyasetnames (mirrors for princes) ameliorated the situation for 
a while.   
Here I will present the development of three dimensions of Islamic thought (metaphysics, 
şeriat, and politics). They are conceptually separate and their historical developments 
independent from each other. However, these dimenisons reflect the non-existence of an 
independent ethical realm within Islamic classical thought7. This realm would be of significance 
in understanding Bediüzzaman’s innovation.  
If we look at the dimension of metaphysics, represented by reason, the triumph belonged 
to the outlook of al-Ash’ari who believed God’s will transcends any rationality. In legal thought, 
after the 10th century, the principles of ash-Shafii, who supported particularistic and literal 
interpretation of the Scripture, dominated the orthodox ümmet; in political thought, beside his 
achievements in philosophy, al-Ghazzali’s political theology constitutes a symbol of orthodox 
understanding of political life, supported by the literature of siyasetnames, both of which suggests 
unquestioned obedience to political authority.    
Before elaborating on the situation of ethics in the classical age of Islam, it is necessary to 
mention some important processes in the formation of Islamic intellectual life. The first process 
or trend is the gradual domination of Traditionalism in the understanding of religious reality. 
Before binding ümmet in details of life and serving only as a global model, the Prophetic 
traditions were diffused within Islamic society during the first centuries. However, the 
intellectual chaos and anarchy –in fact a prolific one- created a necessity to protect the unity of 
ümmet. As there was no common ground within society except religious motivation, and the 
Koran has little to speak about social problems, the solution emerged to be the dependence on the 
Traditions. In the tenth century, this process bore its perfect fruits, the Sahihs and Sünens –the 
collection of Traditions8. They were so politically motivated that the first chapters dealt with the 
traditions on metaphysical questions which created political cleavages, (to compare, one of the 
first tradition collections emerged before the metaphysical clashes Muwatta, included no 
theological traditions). For the Traditionalists, the solution of theological questions, as well as 
                                                 
7 In fact, I borrowed this idea of non-existence of ethical telos from Fazlur Rahman. Mainly, 
Islam and Modernity (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984) and Tarih Boyunca İslami 
Metodoloji Sorunu (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 1995), both has a leitmotiv of this kind. 
Even though he insists on the legal thought, I believe this situation existed also in other realms.   
8 Juynboll, Hadis Tarihinin Yeniden İnşası, (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2002) elaborates 
this process profoundly. 
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other social problems, did not depend on rational questioning but on strict obedience on the 
words of the Prophet9.  
A second process that went hand in hand with the first trend was the systematization of 
Islamic premises. It was realized under an influence of other civilizations. Mu’tazila was a direct 
answer to the questions that were posed by the new Muslims of Persian or Hellenistic cultures. 
Maybe their solution was problematic, but they represented the first systematization of Islamic 
metaphysical principles. The flexible legal thought, which adopted regional social settings into 
Islam, required also a unified systematic approach that would be common for all regions in order 
to prevent anarchy and chaos. 
A third significant process is presented in the previous paragraphs. One of the most 
prominent features of Islamic thought was an abiding need to preserve unity of Islamic society. 
The triumph of the intellectuals I mentioned, in fact, represented the feeling of ümmet to protect 
itself. The name of the orthodoxy apparently reflects this: Ehl-i Sünnet ve Cemaat. Cemaat 
(community) has a right to suppress deviations. Any deviation from ümmet is fitne (dissension), 
which is condemned by the Koran.10  
Even though the end of these three processes –traditionalism, systematization, and 
preservation of community- resulted in a dogmatic view after 12th century, the figures such as al-
Ghazzali, ash-Shafii and al-Ash’ari were never dogmatic intellectuals11. The classical age was an 
era of deep rational questioning and the works of these figures obviously reflect this profound 
usage of reason, even though their solution rejected reason.  
The rationale behind the usage of reason in the classical age has two dimensions. First, 
Koran insists on usage of reason to grasp reality. However, what is significant is that: the Koran 
and the Prophet provide the ground for the free usage of reason. Koran repeatedly states that God 
donated the Prophets with the Book and the Hikmet (wisdom)12. Additionally, the Prophet 
repeatedly stresses that there are hidden meanings of the revelation solidified as the hakikat (the 
                                                 
9 In fact these traditions seem to be the reflection of famous scholars’ ideas to the words of 
Prophet. For detail, Rahman, 1995.  
10 Özek, A. (ed) Kur’an-ı Kerim ve Açıklamalı Meali, (Medine-i Münevvere: Suudi Arabistan 
Krallığı, 1987): 333, verse: 2:217  
11 Works of al-Ghazzali were famous of their rationality in method. Ash-Shafii’s ar-Risale for 
example is a good illustration of the usage of rational thought. And al-Ash’ari converted from 
Mu’tazila to some sort of Sunni outlook with a rational questioning. 
12 e.g. Özek (ed), 1987: 411, verse: 31:12  
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truth). Within the process mentioned above, this hikmet and hakikat created an opportunity for 
entire intellectual groups of the classical age to seek for deeper meanings of the revelation. Even 
the Muslim philosophers did not hesitate in grasping Greek philosophy as the Divine Wisdom 
(hikmet-i İlahiye). The Sufis did not hesitate to transfer Indian, Christian and Persian Gnosticism, 
as they perceived it, as a part of hikmet or hakikat.  However, the prolific tension between the 
scripture and reason, or zahir (appearance) and batın (essence) would create a social crisis; the 
solution was the triumph of orthodox thought in the 12th century.13 
 
B. KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL 
 One of the most important disputes in the Islamic classical age was the reason’s capability 
to grasp good and evil. A discussion of this theme necessitates an understanding of certain core 
principles of the intellectual schools. In the Islamic world, answer to this question had two 
components: (1) the principle attribute of God and (2) the conception of nature.  
 One of the first radical answers given to this question was an affirmative one. Mu’tazila’s 
claim was that God’s rule of conduct with the whole universe is justice.14 Secondly, God created 
nature with its laws.15 The conclusion was that, as justice requires equality of man in learning 
ethical duties, and as things have natural ethical characteristics, man by application of reason can 
grasp ethical quality of things.16 According to this understanding, ethical quality is immanent to 
things. God comdemns something because it is evil in nature. It is not that God’s condemnation 
makes the things evil17. It is obvious that such a claim would profoundly clash with a vision of a 
god having absolute will and power. What Mu’tazila did in order to avoid such confrontations 
was te’vil (interpretation)18. They used the tension between zahir of the Scripture and batın 
(hakikatt of the Scripture) in order to justify themselves. 
                                                 
13 An eloquent discussion on hikmet and hakikat and their elaboration in the Classical Islam can 
be found in Corbin, H. İslam Felsefesi Tarihi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994): 9-49. 
14 Bumin (ed) Felsefe 2002 (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 2002): 287.  
15 Bumin (ed): 2002: 289. 
16 Bumin (ed) 2002: 283 
17 For an illustration of Mu’tazila thought, see Bumin (ed), 2002: 283-291 (compared with 
Ash’arism). also El-Faruki, İslam Kültür Atlası, (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1991): 314-318. and 
Corbin, 1994: 205-217.  
18 The principle that ‘when reason and scripture conflicts, reason is fundamental and scripture is 
interpreted (te’vil) is a heritage of Mu’tazila.   
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 A second problem of the Mu’tazila was their inevitable degradation of revelation into an 
auxiliary position to the Revelation.19 What happens if reason is able to independently grasp the 
rule of ethics is the question. Then revelation would become only a reminder of the ethical truth 
for the Mu’tazila theologians. Their insistence on justice required that, due to God’s justice, 
people without any revelation as well as Muslims should have equal chance. Not surprisingly, 
Orthodoxy could not absorb this thought, even though for a while Mu’tazila was able to ensure 
official support of the Abbasids. 
 A more sophisticated answer in assuming rationality of ethics was the answer of the 
philosophers. For them, God is understood as an Absolute Reason who contemplates himself.20 
The creation is, rather than a planned will, an eternal emanation of reason.21 Secondly, emanation 
is an attempt to demonstrate existence of multiplicity within a source of unity.22 This multiplicity 
can only be understandable in the eternal existence of an unformed matter on which emanation 
exists. As matter is eternal, it has a nature. And as God is rational, emanation is completely 
rational. The result is that, as with any phenomena, ethics is completely rational. And as there is 
no Divine Will but emanation and matter, things have independent natures.23 So a rational man 
can grasp ethical quality of things.24 Moving from different premises, philosophers converge with 
the Mu’tazila thought. However, there are some subtle points in philosophers’ ideas that enable 
them to fit into a religious discourse. Even though they accept that reason can grasp ethics, they 
believe that man can find only universal ethical premises through reason. The particular 
historical-geographical setting of ethical issues is in the realm of religion.25 Secondly, religion is 
also significant for its nature. Religion constitutes the contact of man with Active Reason 
(identified with the Angel of Revelation, Gabriel) within the process of perfect imagination. 
Philosophy is also a contact with Active Reason, via pure rational effort. Then religion and 
                                                 
19 Leaman, Ortaçağ İslam Felsefesi, (İstanbul: İz Yayınları, 2000): 233-35. 
20 Bumin, 2002: 274 
21 Harre, One Thousand Years of Philosophy: From Ramanuja to Wittgenstein (Maldon, Mass: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000): 129-30 
22 Harre, 2000: 131 
23 This argumentation can be followed in Harre, 2000: 123-131. 
24 Leaman, 2000: 244. 
25 Leaman, 2000: 241 
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reason are completely identical: one for common people who do not understand from pure 
deductions, and the other for the elites who are able to think in abstract forms26.  
 Even though philosophers tried to compromise reason and revelation, proponents of 
orthodoxy were not happy with the philosophers’ solution. Firstly, the Divine Will was rejected, 
which obviously conflicted with the Scripture. Secondly, philosophers rejected the concept of 
creation -from nothing-, which is a tenet of Koran. Related to this, the idea of a nature 
independent of God was problematic for the general mood of Islamic community.  
 Another answer with distinguishing features to the question of ethics was that of Sufis. In 
the classical age there was not a common philosophy of Sufism, but a general attitude which 
assumed God as pure love and unity, and considered the rediscovery of pre-existing unity 
between God and man as the cause of life. Then there emerged an ethical telos in Sufism to re-
experience the unity. In this effort, appearance of şeriat becomes a door in which the requisites of 
hakikat would differ27. Despite its originality, Sufi philosophy would not dominate the classical 
age before its marriage with Ehl-i Sünnet doctrine. By this marriage, the personal ethic of Sufism 
was integrated into a collective morality whose zenith may be al-Ghazzali’s monument, İhya al 
Ulum al Din.    
Then what was the solution of the so-called Ehl-i Sünnet on the question of ethics? In 
both aspects, God’s attribute and nature, Ash’arism completely rejected the premises of the 
Mu’tazila and the philosophers. (1) God’s main attribute is His absolute will and power.28 (2) So 
there is no nature of things but what nature is what God arbitrarily attributes to things.29 If God is 
omnipotent with absolute will, then there is no ethical responsibility of God. He can do what he 
wants, even persecution. If he does anything he wants, he may order arbitrarily; thus things do 
not have ethical qualities in themselves, so that reason cannot grasp ethics. Ethical qualities are 
                                                 
26 My main figure in philosophy is al-Farabi. Even though there are some deviations, he gives the 
most characteristic ideas of philosophers. For more elaboration on the effort of philosophers, see: 
Bumin (ed), 2002: 270-279. Corbin, 1994: 279-312. For a global outlook, Harre, 2000: 123-140, 
148-151. Leaman, 2000: 241-252. 
27The main figures Corbin (1994) mentions seem to share such a vision. In al-Bestami, and 
Ahmed al-Ghazzali (brother of the famous al-Ghazzali) there is an understanding of such a unity. 
(pp. 340, 351). Cunayd al-Baghdadi also insists on experiencing unity (tevhid), not proving it. 
(pp. 341-343). He also claims hakikat does not degrade şeriat, but it is inner meaning of it. A 
comprehensive view of Sufism is also given in Bumin (ed), 2002: 297-302.    
28 Bumin, (ed.) 2002: 287. 
29 El-Faruki, 1991: 322 
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not rational per se, but they should be obeyed as God commands. These orders may have 
rationale but this is not the point. There is no objective ethics30.  
The rationale behind this philosophy is the Ash’ari view of cosmos. The basic principle is 
the following: the cosmos consists of indivisible atoms. As qualities cannot abide in this infinite 
division, qualities are not natural. So these atoms should take their qualities from God’s will. And 
as time passes and the atoms, their relations, etc. are qualified continuously, this is not eternal and 
should be recreated at each moment. The whole universe, in this manner is recreated infinitely in 
each moment.31  
The meaning of this formulation for ethics is that things take their ethical quality by only 
divine will. Then the source to learn ethics is only via revelation, and nothing else. This statement 
implies that, people unaware from revelation are irresponsible in their actions.32 
Even though Ash’arism reflected the general mood of immense conservatism in the 
Islamic community and even though it became a state ideology in the 12th century, to deduce 
universal ethical premises or an ethical telos from this ideology is impossible. Ash’arism could be 
useful in a community where a consensus in religion exists. For a man like Said-i Kürdi, who 
should deal with non-Muslim ethics of modernity, Ash’arism would not function as a good 
starting point, even though he may share the cosmology of Ash’arism. In his efforts, even though 
having a different mentality, Kürdi would converge to the discourse of philosophers.  
For several reasons, philosophers could become a basis for Kürdi. Firstly, they presented 
a device to legitimize ethical quality of patterns of behavior which was reason. Secondly, they 
had a primordial idea of a telos of şeriat (which will be dealt in the coming section). Thirdly, 
philosophers, in their efforts to converge revelation and Greek wisdom, provided a background 
for Kürdi to compromise religion and reason in the challenge of modern reason. 
 
C. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HOLY LAW 
The development of Islamic legal thought was was characterized by a number of 
cleavages. First was the issue of the nature of the Prophet. The claim that Prophetic deeds, in all 
sense, inspired by a divine nature clashed with the idea that, except for his transmission of 
revelation, the Prophet was equal to other people. The second point of tension was on the role of 
                                                 
30 An excellent explanation of Ash’arism is Corbin, 1994: 217-234. also, Leaman, 2000: 221-241.  
31 El-Faruki, 1991: 319-22. 
32 Bumin (ed), 2002: 286  
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reason in understanding the will of God on social problems. The question was ‘Can reason, 
through contemplating on the Scripture, grasp the main purpose of God which is expressed in 
particular phrases?’ These two intellectual sources of tension constituted the basis of dynamism 
of early Islamic legal thought.33 Although these categories were never explicitly formulated, they 
formed a legal thinking that was expanding in a set of practical needs; the needs which were also 
the result of new conquests. These practical needs and the cleavages mentioned above shaped the 
early schools of legal thought.  
The most important school was of ash-Shafii. Basically, he chose the rejection of reason 
and assumed the divine character of Prophetic deeds. Even though this school was a late outcome 
of legal thought, it penetrated all existing schools of thought at that moment. For him, even an 
isolated tradition was superior to the application of reason. If it was not possible to solve the 
problem directly in regard to the scripture, only then did he suggest to apply the kıyas: a 
manipulated reason that creates an analogy between the unclear issue and a verdict of the 
Scripture.  
Another possibility in the matrice of reason and the Prophetic model was accepting both 
the divine character of the Prophet and the application of reason: this is Malikism or the Hijaz 
school. Imam Malik strongly depended on the customs of the city of the Prophet, Madina, in his 
legal decrees, as he believed that Madina reflected the spirit of the Prophet. He also used a kind 
of free reason; istislah (public interest) in legal realm. In other words, the key term in Maliki 
response to the new problems was istislah. However, because of its reliance on customs of a city, 
it was bound to demise. The customs of Madina were changing and losing their character to 
reflect the Prophet, and therefore ceased to serve as a source of law. 
What was more responsive to new social problems was the Iraqi school, or Hanafism. In 
the matrice, its position was the rejection of divine attribute and the application of reason in 
several ways, most important of which was istihsan (juristic preference), by which the school 
feels itself free from the boundaries of the kıyas as they seek the more general purposes of şeriat 
in legal problems. Regarding the Prophet, the claimed that he possessed different attributes: i.e. 
his actions as a man of revelation differs from those as a state ruler in religious concerns. Other 
than the religious attribute the Prophet does not bind legal issues. Hanafism became the official 
                                                 
33 This categorization an formulation of the matrice below is my suggestion. 
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denomination of the Turkish empires in later history. Even though it lost its creativity after the 
influence of Shafiism in the 10th century, it still remained responsive to new problems.  
Was it possible to reject both reason and the divine character of the Prophet? In the 
classical age there was the school of Ehl-i Kur’an, which are not known in detail. But 19th 
century India produced a group named Ehl-i Kur’an who, because of this dual rejection, 
ineluctably depended only on the Koran, and its linguistic analysis.34 In fact, none of these 
schools completely rejected the Prophetic model or reason. An understanding of the Scripture per 
se required reason, but an instrumental one. Rejection of the Prophetic divine character did not 
restrain understanding the Prophet as a global, ideal model.  
In the 14th century Spain and the 18th century India, efforts emerged to compromise these 
cleavages. Ash-Shatibi and Ad-Dihlewi, respectively, offered to base legal theory on the 
universal purposes of the şeriat which requires a rational effort and the incorporation of the 
Prophet’s deeds as a reflection of these purposes on a specific historical-geographical context.35 
Bediüzzaman also shares this position.  
This analytical examination should be complemented by the historical presentation. My 
claim is that, what the classical age through legal reasoning lacked was the explicit manifestation 
of an ethical telos to unify the statements of Islamic law. The Koran involved seeds of a 
cosmological thinking as well as a revealed sense of ethics --which was in fact rational for the 
early audience of the message--, and a number of specific legal statements that obstructed 
theorization of a systematic ethical cause.  
 In fact, there are several other reasons for the absence of an expressed telos. Firstly, the 
judicial problems within the first Islamic society preceded any alienation from the freshness of 
the revelation. The Prophet Muhammad’s message was, in a sense, much more progressive in 
ethical cause than the social formulations of Arabic society. The first legal thinkers were at ease 
to feel the ethical spirit of the message, which did not necessitate an explicit statement of the 
idea. In general, revelation was sufficient for their social needs, which was supported by the 
common sincere profound belief in the message. In other words, there existed an ethical 
                                                 
34 Depiction of the modern Ehl-i Kur’an exists in Brown, İslam Düşüncesinde Sünneti Yeniden 
Düşünmek, (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2002): Ch.3.  
35 Examination of ad-Dihlewi can be found in: Baljon, J.M.S. “Şah Veliyullah Dehlevi’nin Şeriat 
Anlayışı.” (İslamiyat vol:1-4, 1998) A sound discussion on ash-Shatibi is Mesud, M.H. İslam 
Hukuku Metodolojisi (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2001).    
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understanding, although completely revealed. Rational consideration of ethics was completely 
embedded in the religious understanding of ethical cause36.  
It is true that, there were some occasions even just after the Prophet’s death that, the 
Islamic community faced uneasy situations not directly answered by the Koran. Omar’s decisions 
in several cases --mainly the divorce act, the issue of conquered Iraqi and Syrian lands, the case 
of müellefe-i kulub, the issue of theft in scarcity, and so on-- seemed to pursue the spirit of the 
message rather than its apparent judgments37. These situations created an expansion of legal 
thought in the first centuries38.  
 Besides the Koran, the first caliphs did not also hesitate to reinterpret the Prophetic 
teachings in their ruling. One of the most known examples is the diversity of the decisions of 
different caliphs on what to do if someone finds lost material. Recent interpretations convincingly 
show the conservation of the spirit of Islamic legal idea while deviating from the Prophet’s 
apparent policies39.  
 Another source of the expansion of legal ideas was a result of expansion of the first 
Islamic empire. Different regions and customs became Islamicised, as local traditions had to be 
handled by the first scholars of holy law. Within these parameters above, there emerged a number 
of legal schools that reached their own understanding of law and icma (general consensus); Hijaz, 
Iraq, Syria and Egypt were the most famous. They were different in methodology as well as in 
customs40.  
 Even though this prolific chaos resulted in perfection of the schools, the application of 
reason –although having a basis in revelation- diminished by time. It had two main causes. 
Firstly, this anarchic environment of legal thought was supported by other problems –-such as 
politics, and theology-- created an atmosphere of strictly depending on the Prophetic traditions: 
                                                 
36In fact, it was explicitly realized by the philosophers, after the discussions of şeriat had been 
resolved. For this reason, their endeavor would be ineffective.    
37 In fact, even during the Prophet’s era, companions were able to suggest solutions to existing 
problems. Sometimes revelation supported their ideas. (Rahman, 1995: 33; Karaman, İslam 
Hukukunda İçtihad, (Ankara: DİB Yay: 1985): 39-43  
38 Omar seems to have believed that when the context changes judgments should also change. No 
one was more courage than him in this issue. (Karaman, 1985: 70-77). 
39 Juynboll, 2002: 34 claims this. Also Karaman, 1985: 59,69 have the same argument. The 
rationale behind this is the perception that Prophet pursued public interest in his ruling.   
40 In fact whole of these revelation, Prophetic model, decisions of strong legal thinkers and 
customs became the core of the first schools, and named as Sunna and icma of these schools. It is 
also true that there was not a hierarchy of sources yet. (Brown, 2002: 20-25).  
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i.e. Traditionalism41. Secondly, fed by this anarchy, the personal-intellectual cleavage in ash-
Shafii himself, between the domination of Traditions and the application of reason, resulted in a 
synthesis that was based on Traditions while applying a limited and a completely manipulated 
reason.42 
 Before the domination of ash-Shafii in the 10th century, there were two main apparatuses 
that helped reason enter into legal realm. In Iraqi School, istihsan permitted some sort of free 
reason. In Hijaz School, istislah created an atmosphere of application of reason conceptually 
independent from revelation. Ash-Shafii would reject both of them and permitted reason only in 
the apparatus of kıyas.43 
 In the 11th century, his paradigm would become effective in the whole Sunni world. 
Supported by Traditionalism, this would result in a perfection of linguistics, as grasping 
resemblance would require perfect literal understanding of the Scripture. Grasping the spirit of 
the message or seeking some rational sense of ethics –which existed but was undeveloped- would 
completely disappear.  
 After the 11th century, due to the systematization of legal methodology of ash-Shafii and 
perfection of Traditions, little space remained for içtihad. The door for içtihad had gradually been 
closed. Within this formalism, the problems of forthcoming centuries would be resolved by the 
concepts of zaruret (social necessity), hile-i şer’iye (legal trick), and the application of örfi hukuk 
(state’s law) which was in fact a disaster for holy law44. In general, the şeriat became unable to 
provide a fresh paradigm of law until the efforts of the 19th century modernism.  
 
                                                 
41 There are few traditions that go back to the companions. (Juynboll, 2002: 46-50). Rahman 
claims that whole body of traditions is a reflection of the ümmet’s solution to social problems 
into an eternal voice: the Prophet’s words. (Rahman, 1995: 60). To pursue the history of 
Traditions (Juynboll does this convincingly) inspires the fact that rather than having more 
traditions in the earlier ages, we have an increase in traditions by the passage of time (Juynboll, 
2002: 62). So they cannot be relied upon.     
42 A discussion on ash-Shafii’s influence is in Rahman, 1984: 22-26. 
43 In fact in his time, ash-Shafii was rejected both by Traditionalists –as he permits usage of 
reason- and by these schools –as he degrades rational effort: Hallaq, “Was al-Shafii the Master 
Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence” Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval Islam, 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 1994): 588-591, 601 
44 Rahman, 1984: 28  
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D. ETHICS IN MIRROR FOR PRINCES AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
 It is not very meaningful to discuss the classical age philosophers in order to understand 
the political outlook of the ümmet of the classical age. They were successful in creating an utopia 
actually based on reason. They were also able to compromise reason and religion in some way. 
However, their inability to influence people on the one hand, and their reluctance to deal with 
practical and emergent problems, on the other, resulted in their ineffectiveness in social 
thought45.  
 Unlike the realms of metaphysics and legal thought, it is uneasy to speak about a 
dominant personality in political thought of the classical age. There were, however, two 
significant trends that dominated the area. First, the works of political theologians –mainly al-
Mawardi, al-Ghazzali, and Ibn Taymiya- that served as a legitimization of the existing political 
order, and second, the siyasetname literature (mirror for princes)–that created an ethical basis for 
government- provided an intellectual political outlook of the classical age.  
 The main problem of the theologians was to compromise political ideals with social 
realities46. Their timing was significant. Before the legitimacy crisis of the sultanate of Abbasids, 
Sunni scholars were reluctant to speak about the ethical quality of the existing states. The ideal 
was obvious: Asr-ı Saadet of the Prophet and the Companions (the Golden Age). Furthermore, 
the Sunni patriarchs like Abu Hanifa and Ibn Hanbal were famous of their passive resistance to 
the political authority. However, when the Abbasids were threatened by Shia claims or when new 
rulers emerged shaking the legitimacy of the Abbasid sovereignty, Sunni scholars felt a pressing 
need to speak about political legitimacy. They would both express the ideals and try to integrate 
these ideals into the existing situation47.  
 One of the most important issues was the character of the ideal ruler. The main condition 
to be an ideal ruler was that he should be profoundly religious and just, beside other secondary 
                                                 
45 Watt, İslam’da Siyasal Düşüncenin Oluşumu (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 2001):104., Kurtoğlu, 
İslam Siyasal Düşüncesinin Ufku (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1999): 215.  
46 Kurtoğlu, 1999: 215. Rosenthal, Ortaçağ’da İslam Siyaset Düşüncesi (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 
1996): 40. For Rosenthal, the main motivation was to preserve the divine character of the 
caliphate and to attack the deviants whose efforts have political dimension.  
47 Kurtoğlu, 1999: 234. For her, main concern of al-Ghazzali was to islamicise the de facto 
situation within the effort of defining an Islamic state in the existing conditions.  
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qualities48. The political elite –ehl-i hall ve akd-, should elect him. Under these conditions, he 
could become a legitimate ruler and named ‘the shadow of God on Earth’. For the theologians, 
sultan/mülk/dünya (state/world) and religion (din) are twins. As religion is fundamental and the 
sultan is the guardian, the sultan is completely necessary for the wellbeing of religion49. For this 
reason, the sultan has a religious and sacred character, and therefore, the state becomes actually 
more important than the religious cause. In fact, all political theologians believed that the issue of 
ruling (imamet) had a religious base, not a rational and secular one. So a legitimate ruler has a 
religious character50.  
 Even though they had a discourse on legitimacy, what theologians had in mind was the 
necessity to preserve the welfare and unity of the ümmet. They assumed, even a ruler who grasps 
sovereignty by force should be obeyed51. Even there was a cliché claiming that a sovereignty of 
60 years characterized by oppression, is preferable to one day of anarchy52. These striking 
statements reflected the limitation of the theologians, mainly due to the pressing conditions of 
sociopolitical reality.  
 The worry of the theologians, to preserve the unity of ümmet in the problematic political 
reality of the late Abbasid period prevented the emergence of a theological discourse on 
legitimate disobedience. Thus, no positive legitimate political action apart from blind obedience 
was provided. Revolt was considered illegitimate but if the rebels became successful, then they 
also became legitimate rulers. Related to this, what is also significant is that, the discourse of 
theologians did not provide a realm of civil space for the ümmet, while ruler could not intervene 
in compulsory religious obligations. For political theology, therefore, the entire social space is 
absorbed by the authority, even though şeriat would create a protected realm for Muslims. 
 The gap of an effective ethical idealistic politics in the theological discourse was filled, to 
some extent, by an ethical rule of conduct of the ruler to the people, as exemplified in the 
                                                 
48 Rosenthal, 1996: 53-54 lists these qualities as the fundamental of wellbeing of the state and 
society.  
49 Kurtoğlu, 1999: 227, 231-232. 
50 Al-Mawardi and al-Ghazzali explicitly gives that idea. Rosenthal, 1996: 43, 57.  
51 Rosenthal, 1996: 48, Kurtoğlu, 1999: 232-233. (Kurtoğlu sees this situation as a cleavage 
between political consciousness and religious consciousness.) It is also mentioned by Lewis that, 
a Muslim with power would always be welcomed as a legitimate ruler in the Islamic world. 
(Lewis, Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991): 99)  
52 Lewis, 1991: 100-102.  
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siyasetnames53. There are three significant concepts in this literature: The ruler is the shadow of 
God on Earth; he should apply justice in his conduct with people; and the people’s ideal ethical 
behavior is obedience. The relation between ruler and the ruled is symbolized by three 
metaphors: father-son, tree-roots, and shepherd-sheep; all of which persuasively required the 
ruler to apply justice towards people for a prosperous state and society. Another convincing 
theme is the famous circle of justice, which tells that the enforcement of the application of justice 
to the people is fundamental for a powerful state.  
 As much as political theology legitimized political reality and based its ideas, rather 
pessimistically, on reality due to the fact that their problem was to preserve unity; siyasetnames 
were effective in creating an ideal rule of conduct, partly because their roots came from the 
wisdom of actual political rule. They have, however, some common characteristics. Firstly, 
neither of them distinguish ethics from politics. (In fact, before Machiavelli this attitude was 
universal). Secondly, even though both spoke of the characteristics of an ideal rule, they were 
unable to carry a discourse on people’s legitimate political action apart from obedience. This 
included an absence of legitimate disobedience. For the political theologians, rebellion was one 
of the worst behaviors, named fitne. In the siyasetname literature the claim was that, injustice will 
naturally bring the death of the state. As its audience is the rulers, it has nothing to say more 
about how the state would perish under unfair rule.  Thirdly, in siyasetnames, religion, beside 
being an ethical quality of the ruler, turns into a tool for rule. In theology, on the other hand, 
religion was generally sacrificed for the emergent political needs (which is true for al-Mawardi 
and al-Ghazzali). 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Up to this point, I have presented the classical heritage in order to grasp Kürdi’s 
reformation. My claim is that, one of the important accomplishments of Kürdi was the creation of 
a rational ethical dimension (through a social thought) that would control the interpretation of 
revelation, legal system and politics. In other words, this ethical reason in Kürdi would result in a 
radical positioning, which shapes the understanding of religion; mainly, the understanding 
revelation, the şeriat and ideal politics. This position differs profoundly from the view of taking 
the Scripture as the basis and limiting the understanding of ethics with revelation.  
                                                 
53 A nice introduction to the siyasetnames is Bumin (ed), 2002: 307-319.  
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This chapter demonstrated that the classical age had lost this dimension of a manifested 
totalistic ethical telos in its zenith: in the 11th, 12th centuries. In the realm of metaphysics, ethics 
was completely absorbed by revelation. In the legal realm, emphasis was given mainly to the 
words of the Scripture. In the political realm, people were completely alienated from the issues of 
politics. In other words, parallel to the non-existence of a rational ethics, public space was absent 
in the classical age. 
It should be noted that, even though rationality of ethical dimension had been absorbed by 
urgent needs, it may not have been a problem for the classical age ümmet. The reason is that there 
has not yet emerged an alienation from the spirit of religious weltanschauung. The things should 
be done because God wants it, and there need not to be a questioning of the demand because the 
social reality had already been constructed by the religious discourse.  
 The power of political authority was also naturalized to such a degree that it was mentally 
impossible to think of active participation into the political realm. The hidden consensus that the 
ruler should apply justice, which was beneficial for the ruled to some extent, did not create a 
legitimate political activity on behalf of the population.  
 The questioning of religious cause and problematization of socio-political realm 
necessitated an alienation from this worldview, which happened by the emergence of hegemony 
of the Western civilization over the Islamic world in the 19th century. This is the problematic of 
second chapter.   
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
FORMATION OF AN INTELLECTUAL: THE MODERN IMPACTS 
 
 
 
 
 Nothing is known about Bediüzzaman’s intellectual formation historically. However, 
textual analysis of his books leads to the idea that he has been influenced considerabily by 
modern intellectual heritage. This may be a result of his readings on popular subjects and authors. 
Most probably and most intensively it is the case that he quite well absorbed freely floating ideas. 
He had an established madrasa education and was socialized in the Naqshbandi-Khalidi order. 
After this, he spent sixteen years at the court of two subsequent governors of Van: Hasan Paşa 
and Tahir Paşa respectively, both of whom were presented in Kürdi’s biographies as 
knowledgable about modern intellectual developments in the Empire. This was his second 
socialization environment where he found means to study modern philosophy and sciences. 
Through his dialogueues with the mekteb-originated officers around Hasan and Tahir Paşas, his 
work suggests that he had sufficient understanding of modern knowledge. However, his appeal in 
politics is still unknown to us apart from the fact that in 1892 he met disciples of Afghani and 
Sheikh as-Sanusi where he embraced their political inclinations. In the same year also, he says 
that he read a booklet by Namık Kemal. He asserts that until 1907, when he first came to 
İstanbul, he assumed the government as benevolent to society, but then, just after observing the 
actions of state against him, he understood that the source of evil in Islamic lands was in fact 
İstanbul. Just in 1907 he met with Young Turk leaders, and we can assume his political character 
was shaped in his intensive dialogue with the Young Turks.54  
 We do not know about his early readings. However, certain impacts are clear: his fıkıh 
project reflects certain parallelisms with the fıkıh considerations in the Islamic world. His 
political concern to Islamicize modern political institutions seems to be motivated by his 
acquaintenance with the Young Ottoman ideas. His understanding of a scientific-based society 
                                                 
54 These important aspects of his early life can be found in Tarihçe-i Hayat written by his cousin, 
Abdurrahman Nursi. One can also look Celal Tetiker and Ramazan Balcı Yeni Tarihçe-i Hayat 
(İstanbul: Gelenek Yayınları, 2003) Written in an Islamic outlook, but more academic than any 
other source on his life.  
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owes much to Young Turk discussions. These links as a whole contributed to the socio-political 
project of Kürdi in their application to his former knowledge on Islam. 
 This chapter will deal with certain categorical impacts of these intellectual traditions on 
Bediüzzaman. My aim is not to consume these traditions as themselves. However, what I want to 
do is, first, to reflect certain aspects of these traditions which I assume Bediüzzaman was 
influenced. Secondly, this chapter would present some significant aspects of the 19th century 
intellectual climate.  
 Depending on the secondary literature, it seems that the understanding of the relation of 
Islamic intellectual’s relation to the Western civilization in the 19th century can be theorized with 
a juxtaposition of two concepts: hermeneutics and orientalism. The relation is hermeneutical 
because the intellectual chooses the aspects of the Western civilization which he considers as 
significant; and then, he redefines these concepts, statements with the parameters of his own 
culture. However, this process is not neutral, because the intellectual, including Bediüzzaman, 
assumes the cultural superiority of the West due to its military and economic power, and what the 
intellectual seeks is power-related: to confront the West. I mean that, he works in the parameters 
of Orientalism when he assumes cultural superiority and tries to transcend it.    
 
A. 19TH CENTURY SUFISM 
Bediüzzaman’s interest in the social dimension of Islam can be traced back to the 
environment of his socialization: i.e. the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya order, widespread in 
Kürdistan It was this tradition in which Kürdi grasped his most significant motivations, even 
though he had never identified himself with any tariqa order.  
This motivation in Kürdi was also an outcome of the expansion of the reform in Magrib 
Sufism in general, and of the special characteristics of the Naqshbandiyya order in particular. 
This reform focused the attention of the Sufis to the Prophet and his Sunna through work on the 
Prophetic Traditions rather than the previous insistence on the unity with God through esoteric 
teachings. Second aspect of this revival was the rejection of asceticism in favour of practical 
activism.55 Even though, this shift from esotericism to ethical Sufism in NorthWestern Africa 
emerged more as a response to the Wahhabi threat rather than Western domination,56 its influence 
                                                 
55 Trimingham, J.S. The Sufi Orders in Islam, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973): 107 
56 Trimingham, 1973: 105 
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in Asia prepared a background for Bediüzzaman to link a theological outlook into his study of 
social theory. His biography reveals the direct influence of an African tariqa doctrine on him: i.e. 
al-Sanusiyya. As a part of the reform mentioned above, Sanusiyya depended on three principles: 
(1) the duty of the tariqa is elimination of the causes of disunity among Muslims; (2) in order to 
do that a return to the sources (Koran and Sunna) is necessary; (3) the outcome of the endeavor is 
a theocratic organization of society,57 which are in fact the leitmotivs of Kürdi’s social thought. 
In fact such a shift from internal life of the Muslims to the external conditions of Islamic 
life was provided by the teachings of Naqshbandiyya order in the 17th century by Ahmed Sirhindi 
who had a profound influence on Kürdi’s social environment. Sirhindi insisted on two issues: (1) 
the elimination of corrupt innovation (bid’at) and obedience to the Ehl-i Sünnet doctrine;58 (2) 
the revitalization of the Muslim community.59 He offered, for this purpose, a balance between the 
inner dimension of life, which was provided by Sufi teachings, and the outer dimension of life of 
the believer, which was provided by the Sunni doctrine. The key concept for Sirhindi was 
‘khalwat dar anjuman’ which meant focusing on God inwardly, but outwardly taking an active 
part in the community.60  
In the 19th century, it was Mawlana Khalid al-Baghdadi who, in the Naqshbandi order, 
responded the new challenge of Western power through a reinterpretation of the doctrinal content 
of the order and intensifying the external dimension of Islamic life: his concern was the 
restoration of the Sunna and the şeriat. In this attempt, as the rulers were regarded as the real 
responsible of social decadence, al-Baghdadi believed that the order should influence the Muslim 
rulers.61  
To sum up, in the intensive Sufi atmosphere of his socialization process, Bediüzzaman 
seems to have grasped the very idea that the Islamic spiritual teaching should relate itself deeply 
with social formation of life. The 19th century Sufism in general, and Khalidiyya order in 
particular promoted such a relation. However, Bediüzzaman’s project was not limited with the 
concerns of tariqa orders. His acceptance of the necessary return to the Koran and the Sunna to 
reach the unity of ümmet required a research on the contemporary interpretations of Islamic law. 
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This fact, therefore, necessitates some brushwork on the intellectual developments in the Islamic 
world. The motivation instigated by Sufism to discover ideal Islamic foundations for political life 
did relate him with the Young Ottomans. In this regard, the categorical impact of the Young 
Ottomans will be presented. His motivation, derived from 19th century Sufism, for the search for 
an ideal Islamic social order would lead him to the Young Turks. In this aspect, the Young Turks 
in their influence on Kürdi should be studied. What should be kept in mind is that, firstly, through 
his intellectual formation, the Western impact had always been the source of his problematic. 
And secondly, this categorization should be understood as an abstraction, meaning that Kürdi 
seems not to have systematically read the intellectuals of the age but understood and interpreted 
freely-floating-ideas.    
 
B. 19TH CENTURY ISLAMIC INTELLIGENTSIA   
Can the intellectuals of the Islamic world outside the Ottoman center in the 19th century 
be viewed as a cohort with common reform concerns? Though it is not the concern of this study,  
with regard to one certain aspect Islamic intellectuals seem to have had a common attitude, which 
was concerning the realm of Islamic law/fıkıh. Indian, Egyptian, Syrian, Tatar Muslims were 
challenged by different problems, the problems most of which were sourced from different 
confrontations of modernity, but their main concern was the assumedly source of problem: i.e. 
fıkıh. The problem of the Islamic world was a worldly one. Thus, for remedy, the fıkıh should 
have been reinterpreted.  
Posing the question as such reveals some common attitudes taken by these intellectuals. 
First of all, the medieval fıkıh was obsolete. In the Afghani-Abduh reformation, historical Islam 
was marginalized through a claim on the legitimacy of only two sources: i.e. The Scripture and 
the reason.62 The progenitors of Tatar reform, Kursavi and Mercani, insisted on the necessity to 
return to pure Islam and condemned the Medieval scholarship.63 The intellectual leitmotif of the 
Salafi movement in Syria was more the inner degeneration of Islamic community throughout 
centuries, than Western challenge.64 In India also, the movement fostered by Shah Veliyullah was 
                                                 
62 Al-Azmeh, A. İslamlar ve Moderniteler (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003): 162 
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radicalized by the 19th century Ehl-i Hadis to reject the medieval fıkıh and return to the original 
Islam through the Scripture (the Koran and the Sunna).65 
Secondly, if medieval fıkıh is obsolete, then the door of içtihad should be opened. In fact, 
the background behind the condemnation of the Medieval Islam and an appeal to return to the 
Asr-ı Saadet required an alienation from the medieval heritage. It seems to be that this alienation 
was a result of the challenge of modernity. The 19th century Muslim intellectual had to be critical 
toward the medieval heritage in order to respond accurately to this challenge. The a priori 
condition for this response would be the promotion and the legitimization of new içtihads. This 
condition requires to condemn emulation (taklid). In Turkistan, Kursavi and Mercani represented 
the extreme position: i.e. every Muslim had the right to decide on religious affairs.66 Their 
follower Bigiyef progressed this position to its ontological extreme: accordingly, none of the 
existing religions (including Islam) pleases God because all of them depend on oppression.67 
Abduh, in Egypt suggested that apart from the issues on worship, religious problems should be 
decided through the application of reason to the Scripture.68 In order to avoid complete rejection 
of his reform by the Muslim common sense, Abduh applied syncretism (telfik) between the ideas 
of past masters in his içtihads.69 What the Ehl-i Hadis in India and the Salafis in Syria 
represented was the democratization of religious knowledge through direct relation to the 
Scripture.70 
What is presented up to now constitutes the 19th century Scripturalism which was 
influential in the entire Islamic world. According to Commins, two factors promoted this 
movement: (1) the belief that traditional Islam lost its vitality vis-à-vis the European power, and 
(2) the conviction that Muslims should unite, against the European threat, by transcending 
differences, which is possible only by depending on the Scripture.71 Thus, the attempt of the 
Islamic reformer was three-fold: içtihad was from then on a world-centric occupation; second, 
içtihad would deal with the source of European power; and third, the reformer would become 
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involved with the Scripture to a greater extent.. These constituted the reformer’s dependence on 
public interest (maslahat), reason (akıl) and the Koran through shaking the foundations of the 
Sunna.  
Then, the third ontological step was that içtihad should serve not only the needs of the 
afterworld but also the worldly needs of Islamic society,. The crucial point is that Afghani had 
formulated Islam as a civilization rather than as a religion.72 He assumed the ümmet as a body in 
decadence, and its salvation depended on the manifestation of its substance which was corrupted 
by its history. For Afghani, ‘the return to the resources’ was the only accurate response against 
the demise of ümmet.73 Similar arguments seem to be valid for the other reformers: i.e. to return 
to the origins was the means for worldly salvation. Salafis insisted on the idea that the Koran’s 
first and foremost cause was spiritual guidance. In that manner, they interpreted (te’vil) 
cosmological verses of Koran,74 but in fact decomposed the unity of the Koranic message. What 
Kursavi in Tataristan had in mind in his offer of içtihad was less to reach the religious truth, but 
more to adapt Islam to new social conditions.75 Egyptian reformer Tahtavi represented this 
motivation perfectly through his idea that the purpose of the society in the world was twofold: i.e. 
besides realizing God’s order, society is for realizing welfare in the world.76   
Depending on the concern for social needs, the fourth claim was that içtihad is an issue of 
social investigation more than a literal exegesis of the Scripture. Believing in a necessity of şer’i 
reform prior to an administrative one, Gasprinskii suggested that müftüs should know both 
religious and worldly sciences.77 This idea was not something exceptional. In Egypt, Tahtavi 
claimed that in order to adapt the şeriat into new situations, the ulama should know the social 
world.78 Abduh, believing that the şeriat is applicable to the entire world if interpreted accurately, 
applied the principle of maslahat frequently as a method of fıkıh. In his approach, maslahat 
superseded the literal exegesis of the nass (text).79 The significance in Abduh’s position is that 
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maslahat lost its transcendental character but emerged as a principle of worldly utility.80 Qasimi 
in Syria suggested in his içtihad that women should learn both religious and secular sciences. 
What is important is that he thought so because for him it was necessary for the innovation of the 
society.81 
Fifth, social fıkıh, based on maslahat, was necessarily rational, and as a rational law it 
should be systematic. The search for maslahat needed the application of reason. Maslahat-based 
fıkıh, thus, required rationalization of fıkıh. In this process, which existed in Egypt mainly, natural 
law gradually became identified with şeriat. This argumentation is most present at Abduh’s idea: 
if şeriat cannot be compromised with the laws of nature, şeriat will collapse.82 The seeds of this 
process can be found in Afghani: his idea of içtihad is mainly a rational and scientific 
interpretation of the scripture.83 In a slight difference, Qasimi, in Damascus would suggest that it 
is reason to interpret the Scripture and apply it to the social world.84 And for him, reason is the 
instrument to reach Unity, implying both in the Divine sense and in the fıkıh realm.85 However, it 
should be mentioned that, even though Qasimi had a systematic view of şeriat, he did not accept 
that the reason alone can grasp the social truth.86  
The full manifestation of this 19th century intellectual trend was the claim that the only 
source of religion was the Koran which was completely in accordance with reason. This phase 
manifested itself in India through a complete rejection of the Prophetic Traditions. According to 
the Ehl-i Kur’an of India, all principles of the religion can be excerpted from the Koran itself. 
This development mainly took its incentive from the clash between the portrait of the Prophet in 
the Traditions and the modern understanding of life.87 In the Afghani-Abduh tradition reason 
became the basis to construct the religion. Afghani believed that the essence of Islam was purely 
rational.88 He, like Qasimi, presents the idea that if the Scripture and reason contradicts, the 
former is interpreted (te’vil) basing reason ontologically prior to the Revelation.89 In fact, this 
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statement depends on Afghani’s belief that human being is capable to grasp the truth by his 
reason alone, and revelation is necessary only to secure man from his passions.90 A step further, 
Abduh identifies Islam with Comte’s rational religion.91 This position was in harmony with 
Abduh’s global position: i.e. maslahat-based systematic fıkıh.  
Bediüzzaman’s methodology of fıkıh seems to derive its main components from the 
global intellectual transformation in the Islamic world in 19th century: it is systematic, rational 
and maslahat-based. Even though as a legal form, the presentation of the development in the 
Islamic world is sufficient to comprehend Kürdi’s legal understanding, Kürdi’s systematization 
of maslahat owes much to the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. This realm is the 
investigation of the appearance of Kürdi’s social theory.  
 
C. THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE: THE YOUNG OTTOMANS  
Turkish modernization seems to manifest itself through its presupposition of what 
civilization is. The concept of civilization led to the reevaluation of the social structure and of 
principles and priorities.92 What is significant is that the meaning of this constructed and 
constructive ‘civilization’ was itself vague in the eyes of the Ottoman modernist: i.e. it could 
represent instrumental rationality: i.e. industrialization and bureaucratization or capitalism as well 
as democracy.93 
For the first modernist generation, i.e. the Tanzimat reformers, it seems that ‘civilization’ 
was considered as instrumental rationality: besides bureauctization what is significant in 
Tanzimat reformers is the idea of industrialization and material progress. For them, civilization 
was single and universal,94 and its source was reason and science which brings progress.95 The 
Tanzimat reformers’ interest in political rights seems to be an outcome of the concerns for 
progress: superiority of law creates loyalty of the citizens to the state and they become attached to 
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the reforms.96 Political liberties and meşveret are necessary since they think that only free man is 
open to progress.97  
The Young Ottoman reform project can be read as a continuity of modernization through 
a rejection of some of its parts,98 especially of extreme Westernization. However, a more accurate 
interpretation would manifest itself through reconsideration of what civilization is. In the Young 
Ottomans, the main concern would be civilization as democracy, rather than material progress.  
The link between Tanzimat reformation to the Young Ottomans would be Şinasi. Who 
was the follower of civilizing process of Reşid Paşa.99 He was committed to the idea of ‘novelty.’ 
Absolutely aware of the fact that he lives in a new age which was ruled by reason, he based his 
criticism against ‘ancient order’ to reason.100 The outcome of his rationalism is the necessity to 
reach ordinary people as an enlightened man,101 which implied democratization.  
Rationalist democratization required to reach a common understanding of the world. For 
this reason, Şinasi assumed the rationalist character of religion102 and course of history103 
transcending their subjective aspects. The peak point of his project was to assume politics as a 
science basing upon (rational) ethical and philosophical premises, but on religion,104 implying 
positive law should be based on natural law.105  
Şinasi’s influence was not absolute on the Young Ottomans, especially his extreme 
rationalism was filtered by them. However, there seem to be certain significant impacts. First of 
all, they became aware of the novelty of the age. Secondly, they became critical intellectuals 
tending to rationalize their arguments. Assumption of this position is crucial if compared with the 
encyclopedist nature of the intellectuals of the previous generation. From then on, Islam became 
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an ideology as its legitimacy depended on rationality but not on the Transcendental.106 It can also 
be said that influence of Şinasi on the Young Ottomans paved the way for contemplation on the 
political foundations of the Islamic society. They tried to grasp the beneficial aspects of the 
Western civilization and to found them on Islamic premises. What is of significance also is the 
fact that, by Young Ottomans the boundaries between the elite and the commoners became 
transparent with regard to reaching knowledge.107 Following Şinasi, the Young Ottomans were 
writing for the commoners. This is in fact a situation that the Young Ottmans conceived of 
themselves as the guide of the nation.108  
Within this framework, which categorical impacts of the Young Ottomans on 
Bediüzzaman can be discerned? First of all, inasmuch as civilization is considered to be a 
democracy, it necessitated a nation: Islam.109 Secondly, the reason why Islam became the 
political identity was beside its social cohesive force, was its being the foundation of legitimizing 
Western political concepts. From then on, Islam was an ideology. This is most apparent in the 
work of Namık Kemal. His effort can be sümmetrized in replacing natural law which is the basis 
for modern political institutions with the şeriat.110 This purpose necessitated the formulation of a 
social contract where the şeriat defined the contract’s character. Another dimension of this effort 
was the re-conceptualization of certain Islamic concepts such as meşveret and biat, which are 
assumed to serve a reform in the Islamic political order. However, it should be noted that, even 
though these concepts are Islamic-origin, their content are modern: while meşveret implies the 
parliament ideal, biat connotes national sovereignty.111 For this reason, Kemal’s position, in spite 
of his Islamic conceptual framework, can be placed into 19th century Western thought, in fact 
which can be generalized to the other Young Ottomans.112 
Ali Suavi, even though he rejected certain efforts to unite Islam’s and Western political 
discourses,113 his position in the issue of the nature of good and evil (hüsn-kubh) was completely 
                                                 
106 Türköne, M. Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1991): 
24 
107 Türköne, 1991: 26 
108 Kılıçbay, M.A. “Osmanlı Aydını” Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, ed. 
Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985): 56 
109 Türköne, 1991: 245 
110 Mardin, 1996a: 351 
111 Türköne, 1991: 92-104 
112 Türköne, 1991: 92 
113 Mardin, 1996a: 406 
 31 
rationalistic: he even dared what Namık Kemal could not, and claimed that the distinction of 
good and evil was rational rather than based on revelation.114 In other words, if and only if 
something is rationally evil, God forbids it. In this manner, he applied many içtihads with on the 
basis of social concerns –not literal exegesis- and decided the issues according to modern 
demands.115 
The Young Ottoman endeavor in politics can be regarded as an outcome of the 
assumption that Islam is capable of accurately responding the universal Western-origin values,116 
which is a strong sentiment in Bediüzzaman’s efforts. This sentiment necessitated absorbing the 
source of the Western political institutions through application and re-conceptualization of 
Islamic concepts. This sentiment also consisted a systematic, and so, modern form of political 
theory. However, what lacked in Young Ottoman thought was the systematic understanding of 
society independent from the state. Even though they presented some seeds of it,117 the Young 
Turks would emphasize on an independent society with a special implication to science.  
 
D. THE YOUNG TURKS: A MENTALITY 
What was revolutionary in the Young Turk thought was their assumption concerning the 
epistemological foundations of knowledge: rather than Islam, it was the secular and rational 
Enlightenment principles.118 Through this shift in foundations, the Young Turk intellectual 
constructed the ideal society. This shift apparent when considering the common characteristic of 
the outlooks of the sides in the great Young Turk schism during the 2nd Young Turk congress: 
both Ahmed Rıza and Prens Sabahaddin based their understanding of society on scientific 
principles. The former positivist resulted in a centralist and solidarist view of social formation 
whereas the latter, a disciple of Le Play School, claimed the necessity of a decentralist and 
individualistic society.119 This schism in fact reflected the shift from an understanding of 
civilization as a political model to a concern of civilization as a certain social model; in other 
words, the Young Turk manifests itself through a belief in scientific society.  
                                                 
114 Çelik, H. Ali Suavi ve Dönemi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994): 593-4 
115 Çelik, 1994: 686-91 
116 Türköne, 1991: 27-8 
117 Mardin, 2002: 44 
118 Göçek, 1999: 274 
119 Akşin, S. “Jön Türkler” Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, ed. Murat Belge 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985): 835 
 32 
Founding the social system on science rather than on religion brought dramatic changes. 
Accordingly, ethics should be secularized as in Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmed Rıza, Mizancı Murad, 
and Beşir Fuad. For Abdullah Cevdet, ethics should be based on the principles of biological 
materialism.120 Ahmed Rıza as a positivist revised the Young Ottoman belief that natural law was 
manifestation of Divinity and gave an independent mundane existence to the laws of nature.121 
Mizancı Murad’s history lectures were based upon the belief that social life was based upon the 
economic reason.122 An early protagonist of the trend, Beşir Fuad assumed the scientific 
knowledge having the real value and the most ethical activity as rejecting dogma and reaching 
this knowledge.123 
Secularization of ethics essentially followed an implicit rejection of religion. Science 
should replace the position of religion in the society.124 However, for three reasons, they were 
cautious in this attempt. First of all, Abdullah Cevdet believed the Ottomans were able to 
progress only through religious legitimization. Cevdet’s project of ‘içtihad’ depended on the idea 
that Islam’s essence orders material progress.125 Secondly, Islam was a social cohesive factor 
which scientism could not yet supplant. For Ahmed Rıza, this cohesive aspect should be 
preserved until the society absorbed positivist ethics.126 In this aspect, the Young Turks reached 
the people through a religious discourse and tried to manipulate Islam as a source of opposition 
against the sultan. Islam as an instrument for opposition is the third concern of the Young 
Turk.127 Through these concerns, Islam became an issue of social utility in the hands of the 
Young Turk.128 
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The attempt to secularize ethics necessitated a new formulation of society: a secular unit 
rather than ümmet. The key concept in this attempt is national culture (milli kültür.)129 The Young 
Turk journal, Şura-yı Ümmet’s main problematic was milli kültür. Abdullah Cevdet’s insistence 
on the concepts; national language (milli dil), national literature (milli edebiyat) and as their 
solidification ma’şeri vicdan were the symptoms of it.130 His understanding of the individual free 
from dogma as the basis of civilization manifests the horizon of his understanding of 
secularization.131 Ahmed Rıza should also be mentioned here due to his search for complete 
rationalization of the social realm.132 Another significant example, Mizancı Murad formulated the 
corruption of milli kültür through very secular terms: he mentions the significance of national 
spirit (milli ruh), maneviyat and essence rather than, for example, Young Ottoman insistence on 
Islam and şeriat, and claims milli kültür can be preserved through preservation of national 
language.133 A Young Turk journal, Osmanlı Gazetesi, secularizes its discourse through a shift 
from ümmet notion to ahlak-ı içtimaiye is another manifestation of a proposed secular order.134 
Thus, even though the Young Turk tried to manipulate Islam his view of secular ethics 
and social formation essentially created in himself a view of clash between scientific intellectual 
and religious people.135 The clash was between religion and science. Thus the Young Turk 
intellectual constructed his position towards the people in the enlightener-enlightened dichotomy: 
it means elitism136 which depended on obtaining knowledge.137 This elitism would imply the 
understanding of the intellectual that the society was formed of two blocs: the progressivists and 
the reactionaries.138 Another dimension of this elitism was the metaphor used by the Young Turk 
on the relation between the intellectual and the people which was the doctor-patient relationship, 
which implied a static understanding of the social formation.139  
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In fact, behind the dichotomy of religion and science, in the mind of Young Turk 
intellectual, there was a deeper parameter: the Young Turk imagination of social relations did not 
fit the existing Ottoman order. The Young Turks dreamed of a society loyal to abstract principles 
whereas the existing Ottoman society (especially Abdulhamid II’s reign) was constructed through 
personal loyalties.140 From this aspect, Abdullah Cevdet’s,141 Prens Sabahaddin’s142 and Şura-yı 
Ümmet’s143 insistence on individual enterprise and condemnation of searching for official posts, 
Mizancı Murad’s condemnation of the Ottoman system as it suppressed individuality,144 and 
Baha Tevfik’s insistence on individual as the basis of the society and on liberty ultimately as a 
consequence of knowledge but not essentially of a relation to the state145 gain their meaning.  
To sum up, the Young Turk significance can be formulated as follows: they considered 
modernity not merely as industrialization or as a political system; but as a scientific mentality 
which should rule the society. The scientific mentality was assumed to create individuality and 
impersonal bonds within the society. This was an ideal which clashed with the present society in 
which the religion-based personal interactions constituted the social formation. This position 
reflected itself in the society as a clash between science and religion.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The impact of these traditions on Bediüzzaman is through their amalgamation in a process 
of freely floating ideas. This assumption depends on the fact that his political consciousness was 
developed in the years 1907-1908; maybe mostly through discussions with the Young Turks in 
Salonika and reading their newspapers and journals, including the works of other generations. 
However, he reached a significant synthesis; the cause of which transcends the interests and 
inclinations of these generations. Creating a modern mentality, Islamization of modern political 
institutions, intellectual legitimization of material progress, a search for a new fıkıh fitting 
modern needs; all are united in Bediüzzaman for a specific cause: to prepare the intellectual 
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background for the future Islamic civilization. This formulation will be the subject-matter of the 
third chapter.  
Thus, what is presented in this chapter seems to constitute main problematics of 
Bediüzzaman. And the leitmotiv behind these developments seems to be a specific form of 
modernity; i.e. rationalization of Islamic presence. The task of Kürdi in his social theory was to 
compromise rationalization with certain Islamic principles. In this endeavor, his major basis 
seems to be the notion of humankind as the caliph of God on Earth. Through this assumption he 
formulated a social theory dealing with the problems discussed by earlier generations. At his 
theory’s peak point, I claim that he reached a modern notion of ethics in his novel içtihads, which 
are both based on his social theory and reflect a novel and comprehensive understanding of the 
Islamic şeriat.  
 36 
CHAPTER 3:  
 
SOCIAL THOUGHT OF BEDİÜZZAMAN SAİD-İ KURDİ 
 
 
 
 
The project of Bediüzzaman can be formulated in one sentence: he tried to revive the idea 
of mankind’s position as caliph (deputy) of God in the modern era. For this reason, he seems to 
reconceptualize and recontextualize the Enlightenment socio-political ideals within the Islamic 
sensitivities. Thus, my textual analysis here tries to reveal that Kürdi permanently tried to 
instrumentalize Enlightenment’s socio-theoretical premises in order to locate this mundane 
philosophy into a transcendental Islamic worldview.  
Then, the question is how can one formulate the central premises of the Enlightenment 
thought? It seems that the most efficient starting point is ‘civilization.’ Enlightenment cannot be 
thought without the idea of the universality of civilization. The rationale behind this is the 
assumption that ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ are common for all humanity, which brings life to a 
structure of ‘liberty and individualism.’ This logic results in the argument that society is an 
‘imagined community formed by a social contract.’ This means that the ideal state should be 
ruled with a rational ‘constitution.’ This system as a whole is believed to bring a continuous 
‘historical progress.’   
 The European Enlightenment as a whole structured itself upon a denial of religion even 
though it worked with concepts recruited from it. The question is what happens if a different 
belief or religious culture sees necessary to enter into a dialogue with the Enlightenment 
mentality and apparently develop a discourse fitting into it. Is it only a superficial interaction or 
can this culture develop its own Enlightenment? Bediüzzaman is a good case study for this 
question.  
My approach is that Kürdi was very conscious of what he was doing, even though it 
seems to be that he learned the Enlightenment not by direct source readings. He Islamicized the 
Enlightenment thought regarding it as merely an instrument in bringing a new life to the Islamic 
weltanschauung. It is interesting that the title of his collection is Treatises of Light (Risale-i Nur) 
revealing both the Islamic tradition of Ishraqiyyun and the European Enlightenment. In fact, this 
metaphor is sufficient to understand the real character of Bediüzzaman: finding out Islamic 
counterparts and sources for the Enlightenment concepts.  
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Then, this chapter will comprise six sections exploring the views of Kürdi: (1) 
civilization, (2) reason and nature, (3) social contract and imagined communities, (4) liberty and 
individualism, (5) progress and (6) constitution. My claim will be that the substantial difference 
between the Enlightenment and Kürdi’s social theory is that whereas the former instrumentalizes 
the transcendental for the sake of the mundane through creating a rational religion, the latter 
shapes the world as a function of the heaven. 
Before entering into discussion, it should be noted that Bediüzzaman’s involvement in the 
Enlightenment ideas also seem to be indirect. He may have read certain translated books; such as 
Faust by Goethe and Social Contract by Rousseau, he may have been aware of the Western 
philosophical developments through his readings on Western social history and history of 
philosophy when he was in the courts of governors of Van. He may have contemplated on what 
he read on Muslim intellectuals writing about Europe. In the end, he may have reached to an 
understanding of what Europe was.  
Europe seems to have been the most significant constructive component in Kürdi’s 
formulation of a social thought; because his main and urgent problem was the impact of Europe, 
the Enlightenment Europe and its ideas on the Islamic mind. Thus, formulation of Bediüzzaman’s 
social theory through the parameters of the Enlightenment is not only legitimate but also 
comprehensive.  
 
A: A CONCEPTION OF CIVILIZATION 
1. THE PRACTICAL QUESTION: WHAT TO TAKE FROM THE WEST? 
The most efficient way to introduce Kürdi’s approach to civilization is to investigate his 
concept of the benefits of civilization (mehasin-i medeniyet). For Kürdi, in an opposition to the 
philosophical roots of civilization,  mehasin-i medeniyet constitute the legacy of Christianity and 
Islam in the modern civilization (medeniyet-i hazıra)146 (MN: 77). This depiction is crucial in the 
argument of Kürdi inasmuch as there existed a strong opposition in the Ottoman society to a 
dialogue with the modern civilization and appropriation of its institutions. For Kürdi, philosophy 
for itself is essentially naturalistic in opposition to the Islamic outlook (MN: 129); however, 
civilization under the influence of a transcendental religion would lose its character defined by 
                                                 
146 Amma kafirlerin medeniyetinde görülen mehasin ve yüksek terakkiyat-ı sanayi, (bunlar) 
tamamen medeniyet-i İslamiyeden, Kur’an’ın irşadatından, edyan-ı semaveyeden in’ikas ve 
iktibas edildiği… 
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philosophy. Thus, a Muslim can borrow concepts and institutions of the modern civilization as 
far as they emerge out of a transcendental religion.  
In his later years, especially after World War I, Kürdi would claim that the evil side of the 
civilization (mesavi-i medeniyet) would dominate medeniyet-i hazıra due to the triumph of 
philosophy over the Western existence, a claim on which I will later elaborate. At the moment, 
the question is: ‘What should we take from medeniyet-i hazıra?’ According to him, Christianity 
and Islam gave birth in medeniyet-i hazıra to the arts (sanatlar) which are helpful to the society, 
and to the sciences (fünun) which bring justice and truth147 (MN: 129).  
It is necessary to keep in mind that both the terms sanat and fünun have wider meanings 
in Kürdi than their ordinary meanings. For Kürdi, fünun is anything that comprehends the 
existence in order, comprising a realm ranging from physics to politics (RNK 1: 954-5), whereas 
sanat is anything having the features of a human artcraft, ranging from technology to literature148 
(Sün: 180). These meanings could be connected to the following religious outlooks: fünun serves 
for contemplating on God’s names reflecting over creation while sanat serves human to change 
the world imitating God’s names; both of which define human’s position in the universe as the 
caliph of God.  
However, Kürdi’s investigation on medeniyet is not limited to fünun and sanat. For him, 
these realms pave the way for an ethical premise; i.e. humanism. This aspect of medeniyet-i 
hazıra is also an outcome of religious impact (Muh: 122); however, humanism was perfected in 
the course of the development of civilization and its sciences149 (Mün: 65). For Kürdi, sciences of 
civilization gave birth to the love of truth and humanity, and by its research on the substance of 
humanity, a search for true religion had started150 (HŞ: 24), because, one who tastes his humanity 
is the one who feels his eternal character (Mün: 86). 
Inasmuch as humanism is to be appropriated, Kürdi’s position to non-Muslims is 
important. For him, being human is sufficient to love someone irrespective of his/her religion, 
                                                 
 
147 Avrupa ikidir. Birisi, İsevilik din-i hakikisinden ve İslamiyetten aldığı feyiz ile hayat-ı 
içtimaiye-i beşeriyeye nafi sanatları ve adalet ve hakkaniyete hizmet eden fünunları takip eden 
Avrupa(dır).         
148 Hayat-ı içtimaiyeyi faaliyet ve harekete götüren çok ukde-i hayatiyelerden, bizde inkişafa 
başlayan … fikr-i edebiyat         
149 Bahusus, medeniyet hubb-u insaniyeti tevlid eder. 
150 Hem nev-i beşer, hususan medeniyet fenlerinin ikazatıyla uyanmış, intibaha gelmiş, 
insaniyetin mahiyetini anlamış. Elbette ve elbette dinsiz, başıboş yaşayamazlar ve olamazlar.       
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which practically necessitates forming good relations, for example, with Armenians (DHÖ: 44). 
His position towards the Europeans is that a Muslim should seek for rational dialogue with them 
and not to suppress them as Westerners are assumed to be civilized151 (DHÖ: 78) and are not in 
the state of bigotry and fanaticism at the moment (HŞ: 27). However, after World War I, he 
suggested that if the non-Muslim is an enemy and suppressor, his interests should not be 
considered (HŞ: 111).  
Thus, Kürdi underlines that the sciences, the arts and the ethics of medeniyet-i hazıra 
should be appropriated because medeniyet brings out realization of the human potential (DHÖ: 
64). Medeniyet should also be appropriated because it gives an eternity to any cultural 
formation152 (DHÖ: 88). But is this appropriation simply an imitation? No. Kürdi harshly 
criticizes the Westernists of the Ottoman elite as unlucky nationless people (bedbaht 
milliyetsizler) (MN: 86). He also criticizes the Ottoman reformist’s emphasis on mundane 
civilization, warning him in order not to destroy the nation’s bond with the transcendental (MN: 
135).       
For Kürdi, imitation is essentially wrong because of the profound difference between 
Muslim and Western cultures (DHÖ: 86). However, he does not take a position such as: ‘Let’s 
take Western science and technology but preserve our culture,’ even though he makes such 
statements on the surface of his text153 (DHÖ: 87).  The reason is that Kürdi does not consider 
even the apparently most objective side of medeniyet-i hazıra, i.e. the sciences, as a priori truths. 
For him, the sciences should be integrated into the Islamic knowledge (maarif-i İslamiye) in order 
to them to reach truth154 (Mün: 26).  
  
 
 
                                                 
151 Gayr-ı müslime karşı hareketimiz iknadır. Zira onları medeni biliriz. Ve İslamiyeti mahbub ve 
ulvi göstermektir. Zira onları munsıf zannediyoruz.   
152 Tasallut-u medeniyetin zamanında alemin hükümranı ilim ve marifettir….Herhangi devletin 
hayat ve müdebbiri olmuş ise, o hükumeti kendi gibi kayd-ı ömr-ü tabiiden ve ecel-i inkırazdan 
tahlis ve küre-i arz kadar yaşamasına istidat vermiş. Kitab-ı Avrupa sahaifi bunu alenen 
gösteriyor.   
153 Ecnebiyede terakkiyat-ı medeniyeye yardım edecek noktaları (fünun ve sanayi gibi) maal-
memnuniye alacağız.      
154 Bir başkasının reçetesini gösteriyor ki; kalp hastalığı olan zaaf-ı diyanet var. Ben de fünunu 
maarif-i İslamiye ile mezcederek bir macun yapıyorum.  
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2. THE EVIL ASPECT OF THE MODERN CIVILIZATION  
 Kürdi’s criticism of the modern civilization depends on its philosophical roots155 (MN: 
129). In his Republican years, in his famous 30th Word, he stated that the essence of Western 
philosophy is nature. Nature, according to Kürdi, is not limited to the appearance of the universe. 
Rather, Kürdi believes that Western philosophy attributes nature and its laws to everything in the 
universe. For Kürdi, nature is the essence of philosophy, and in his Republican years, Kürdi’s aim 
was to put the nature into its real place.  
 However, for Said in the period 1908-1923, whose main concern was politics, the 
application of nature into the social realm is the problematic. Due to the concept of nature, Kürdi 
believes that the modern civilization formulates each entity living for itself (MN: 131). Then, 
each existing thing seeks for its interests which leads to pleasure and in this process, confronts 
with other things which necessitates the application of power156 (Sün: 166).  This view is, for 
Kürdi, valid for both the universe (Darwinism is a good example) and the social world (the 
formulation of modern nationalism fits here).      
 For Kürdi, this system is bound to demise. In his work of Koranic exegesis, İşarat-ül 
İ’caz, he claims that the reason why order in the universe would collapse is due to the hegemony 
of two faculties of human soul: force of wrath and defense (kuvve-i gadabiye) and force of appeal 
and lust (kuvve-i şeheviye) (İİ: 305). The hegemony of the Western central desires for power and 
pleasure and their dominance on the Western reason (kuvve-i akliye) is the source of this tragedy. 
Kürdi’s view of dominance of kuvve-i şeheviye is the creation of overload of pleasure in the 
civilizing process (Sün: 166). In this respect, it should also be mentioned that, Kürdi does not 
limit power into a limited political definition, rather he considers it as a diffusion in every aspect 
of society (Muh: 32). 
 Kürdi continuously presents his ideas on the evil aspects of Western power and sense of 
pleasure. Rather than being thankful to God, the West prefers to dominate the Islamic world with 
its fünun and sanayi (DHÖ: 76): and medeniyet-i hazıra has a brutal principle to destroy 
everything in order to reach its aims (Sün: 156), the source of Islamic poverty is Western 
oppression (MN: 136), and the West would collapse due to its pleasure-centrism (DHÖ: 81). 
                                                 
155 Felsefe-i tabiiyenin zulmetiyle, medeniyetin seyyiatını mehasin zannederek beşeri sefahete ve 
dalalete sevkeden bozulmuş ikinci Avrupa…  
156 (Şu medeniyetin) nokta-i istinadı kuvvettir…Cazibedar hizmeti, heva ve hevesi teşci’ ve 
arzularını tatmin ve metalibini teshildir.    
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However, for him, its collapse could be seen only after World War I, since mesavi-i medeniyet 
and its philosophical roots has became apparent just by the war (DHÖ: 86).  
 Kürdi is one of the first authors to use the term global village (MN: 105). For him, 
medeniyet-i hazıra in the global village had very much intensified the curtain of blindness (gaflet 
perdesi) which prevented the perception of the reality of the existence. Inasmuch as philosophy 
and medeniyet-i hazıra severe the ties between the transcendental and the mundane and create a 
secular world-view, the perspective of medeniyet-i hazıra concerning the world will lead people 
to suffer spiritually due to the inescapable reality of death and the essential break of the link 
between human and the existence, in other words alienation. In a secular outlook, what the 
medeniyet-i hazıra is able to do is to relax this pain by pumping mundane pleasure. This necessity 
serves for the intensification of gaflet perdesi (MN: 130). 
 According to Kürdi, medeniyet-i hazıra is bound to demise due to its aspect of weakening 
religion157 (MN: 86). In other words, atheism and mundanity become the destroyers of 
civilization ((DHÖ: 80). Therefore the medeniyet-i hazıra, as much as it loses its connection with 
religion, is essentially evil158 (MN: 77).    
 
   3. THE TRUE CIVILATION: ISLAM 
 For Kürdi, there exists a true civilization, apart from the medeniyet-i hazıra and the link 
between the true civilization (medeniyet-i hakikiye) and medeniyet-i hazıra is humanism 
(insaniyet). For him, insaniyet has progressed through medeniyet-i hazıra, and this situation paves 
the way for grand humanism (insaniyet-i kübra), in Kürdi’s terms, for Islam159 (Muh: 32). Since 
Kürdi deals with the concept of humanism, one should ask the question about the essence of 
human being according to Kürdi. His answer is the point of divergence between modernity’s 
conception of civilization and the Islamic one.  
 In harmony with Islamic understanding, Kürdi believes that human being is the most 
significant creature of the existence (MN: 129). Seemingly influenced by the Enlightenment 
                                                 
157 Zaaf-ı dine sebep olan Avrupa medeniyet-i sefihanesi yırtılmaya yüz tuttuğu bir zamanda…   
158 Kafirlerin medeniyeti ile mü’minlerin medeniyeti arasındaki fark: 
Birincisi, medeniyet libasını giymiş korkunç bir vahşettir. Zahiri parlıyor, batını da yakıyor; dışı 
süs, içi pis; surety me’nus, sireti makus bir şeytandır. İkincisi,; batını nur, zahiri rahmet, içi 
muhabbet, dışı uhuvvet, sureti muavenet, sireti şefkat, cazibedar bir melektir.  
159 İnsaniyet bir derece tecelli etti. Beşaret veriyor ki: Asıl insaniyet-i kübra olan İslamiyet, sema-
i müstakbelde ve Asya’nın cinanı üzerinde bulutsuz güneş gibi pertev-efşan olacaktır.  
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thought, he insists on the belief that the human’s essence is good, implying that evil is only 
coincidental to human existence160 (Muh: 109). However, he believes humankind’s significance 
comes from its essence as being the complete reflection of God’s names161 (İİ: 17), which 
necessitates the human being’s responsibility to apply God’s verdict on existence as a caliph of 
God (İİ: 313).  
 For Kürdi, if the link between the Transcendental (God) and the Mundane (Human) is 
destroyed as it happened in the medeniyet-i hazıra having resulted in the World War I, the reality 
of human being changes completely (MN: 132). He turns into the most weakest figure in the 
universe due to the fact of death and the loss of a basis to depend on (nokta-i istinad ve istimdad). 
By the term ‘basis,’ he means God, to get support in fulfilling his desires and against his enemies 
(MN: 185). Inasmuch as human being has infinite number of desires requiring infinite 
satisfaction in an infinite life (MN: 187), the enlightened human essentially seeks a true religion, 
which is Islam (Mün: 86).  
 As far as modernity cuts the link between human being and the existence by its denial of 
the omnipotent God, the medeniyet-i hazıra creates an alienation between human being and the 
existence. However, for Kürdi, Islamic civilization regards the existence in its entirety as brothers 
due to their common link with God. This belief also implies the fact that the entire humanity is a 
brotherhood162 (MN: 77). Then, for Kürdi, it is always illegitimate to create disintegrating bonds 
such as nationalism in the process of creation of an enemy.   
 We can formulate Kürdi’s position towards medeniyet-i hazıra with one principle: 
medeniyet-i hazıra destroyed the link between the Trancendental and the Mundane, resulting in 
the alienation of human being from the existence. Humankind came to perceive itself as the 
owner of itself. Such a belief created the application of power in human relations and a telos of 
                                                 
160 Mükerrem olan insane, insaniyetin cevheri itibariyle daima hakkı satın almak istiyor ve daima 
hakikatı arıyor ve daima maksadı saadettir. Fakat batıl ve dalal ise, hakkı arıyorken haberi 
olmadan eline düşer. 
161 Cenab-ı Hak, insanı, kainata cami’ bir nüsha ve onsekiz bin alemi havi su büyük alemin 
kitabına bir fihrist olarak yaratmıştır. Ve Esma-i Hüsnadan herbirisinin tecelligahı olan herbir 
alemden bir örnek, bir nümune, insanın cevherinde vedia bırakmıştır.     
162 Evet, mü’min olan kimse, iman ve Tevhid iktizasıyla, kainata bir mehd-i uhuvvet nazarıyla 
baktığı gibi; bütün mahlukatı, bilhassa insanları, bilhassa İslamları birbiriyle bağlayan ip de 
ancak uhuvvettir… 
Küfür ise, öyle bir bürudettir ki, kardeşleri bile kardeşlikten çıkarır. Ve bütün eşyada bir nevi 
ecnebilik tohumunu ekiyor ve herşeyi herşeye düşman yapıyor.   
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satisfaction of personal and communitarian desires. However, Kürdi also underlines that the 
medeniyet-i hazıra, besides its philosophical character as such, carries also a primitive but 
significant form of humanism, and sciences and arts necessary for human spiritual development. 
This aspect of the medeniyet-i hazıra, for Kürdi, is based on the legacy of heavenly religions.  
 However, inasmuch as naturalist philosophy started to dominate the medeniyet-i hazıra, it 
is bound to decay due to its false premise on the relation between the Mundane and the 
Transcendental. The medeniyet-i hazıra in general served the hegemony of the Christian world 
over the rest of humanity (Sün: 183), but as it is bound to demise, the true civilization, Islam will 
dominate the world (Sün: 167).  
 Kürdi believes that the Koranic civilization is to emerge (MN: 86). He suggests the 
Ottoman reformists that social progress is possible only by religious principles163 (MN: 86). He 
insists that the Islamic concept of glorifying God’s name (i’la-yı kelimetullah) should be 
elaborated. For him, i’la-yı kelimetullah is possible only by material progress and by entering the 
medeniyet-i hakikiye164 (HŞ: 32). He contrasts the medeniyet-i hakikiye with the medeniyet-i 
hazıra in the way that, while the latter depends on power and satisfaction of desires (heva), the 
former bases itself on truth (hakk) and seeks for spiritual desires to the Transcendental (hüda). 
For Kürdi, hüda will be the base of humanism as it satisfies and develops all aspects of humanity, 
i.e., the Transcendental and the Mundane165 (Sün: 167-8). 
 As a consequence Kürdi believes that Islam satisfies both the necessary mundane and 
firstly, the transcendental needs. He seemingly suggests the rejection of the mundane desires and 
pleasures of world (MN: 102) because of the fact that the world and its happiness are not eternal 
(MN: 128). What is crucial is, he proposes to deny the existence of the mundanity in the hearts, 
not to abandon it in the actual life166 (MN: 106). 
 The balance between hearthly denial of the world and its actual occupation is based on 
Kürdi’s view of the World. For him, the World has three faces. Firstly, it exists for itself, and this 
                                                 
163 Enbiya’nın ekseri Şarkta ve hükemanın ağlebi Garbda gelmesi Kader-i İlahinin bir remzidir 
ki, Şarkı ayağa kaldıracak din ve kalbdir, akıl ve felsefe değil.   
164 Ve bu zamanda ila-i kelimetullah, maddeten terakkiye mütevakkıf ve medeniyet-i hakikiyeye 
girmekle ila-i kelimetullah edilebilir.   
165 (Şeriat-ı Ahmediye’nin istediği medeniyette egemen) heva yerine hüda dır ki; se’ni 
insaniyeten terakki ve ruhen tekamüldür. Hevayı tahdit eder, nefsin hevesat-ı süfliyesinin 
teshiline bedel, ruhun hissiyat-ı ulviyesini tatmin eder.  
166 Dört şey için dünyayı kesben değil kalben terk etmek lazımdır.  
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is its evil side. For Kürdi, anything having no connection with the transcendental is evil in itself 
and should be denied. The second aspect of the World is it is the ground of preparation to the 
Hereafter. The third face is its essence as the reflection of God’s names. In these last two faces 
the Muslim should be active167 (MN: 69). Inasmuch as human being is the caliph of God on the 
Earth, he has the right and responsibility to rule the universe in the name of God168 (İİ: 313) 
 
B. THE IDEA OF REASON IN SAİD-İ KÜRDİ 
In Bediüzzaman, the concept that operates as the center of his understanding of 
civilization is reason. In this section, I will first discuss how Kürdi regards the reason as essential. 
Then, I will concentrate upon how Kürdi appropriated the Enlightenment’s legacy of reason and 
establishes it as a concept of the Islamic culture. The last thing of discussion is to formulate the 
vision of the nature in Kürdi. This last subsection depends on the essential relation between the 
reason and the nature. 
  
1. BEDİÜZZAMAN’S PRACTICAL CONCERN FOR REASON 
Related with his sociopolitical purpose, to establish the intellectual foundations of the true 
civilization, Islam, Kürdi assumes that in the future the reason will dominate and through its 
domination, Islam, which depends on strong rational proof (bürhan-ı akli) and which bases all its 
judgments upon reason will dominate169 (HŞ: 27). Kürdi believes the weapon of Islam at that 
moment is nothing but undeniable strong proofs (berahin-i katıa) (DHÖ: 47). His insistence upon 
bürhan in fact is a legacy of classical Islamic philosophers who dichotomized reason and 
imagination, one’s product is bürhan, whereas the other’s is metaphor. This dichotomy suggests 
the idea that ordinary people are convinced by the metaphors mainly provided by the revelation, 
                                                 
167 Dünyanın üç vechi vardır: 
Birincisi ahirete bakar; çünkü onun mezraasıdır. 
İkincisi, Esma-i Hüsnaya bakar; çünkü onların mektep ve tezgahlarıdır. 
Üçüncüsü, kasten ve bizzat kendi kendine bakar. Bu vecihle insanların hevesatına, keyiflerine ve 
bu fani hayatın tekalifine medar olur. Nur-u imanla dünyanın evvelki iki vechine bakmak, manevi 
bir cennet gibi olur. Üçüncü vecih ise, dünyanın fena yüzüdür ki, zati ve ehemmiyetli bir kıymeti 
yoktur.     
168 Cenab-ı Hakkın arzında beşerin halifesi olması, Allah’ın hükümlerini icra ve kanunlarını 
tatbik etmesi içindir. Bu ise tam bir ilme mütevakkıftır.    
169 Akıl ve ilim ve fen hükmettiği istikbalde, elbette bürhan-ı akliye istinat eden ve bütün 
hükümlerini akla tesbit ettiren Kur’an hükmedecek.   
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whereas the elites require rational proof/bürhan, the purpose of philosophy. Through his 
insistence upon reason and bürhan, Kürdi seems to converge on the classical philosophical 
tradition. He reveals this idea in his speech to some ordinary Kurdish people telling them to 
understand from metaphor, but not from speculative bürhan (Mün: 24).  
For Kürdi, the search for reason and bürhan is not novel. Kürdi relates his rationalism to 
the Golden Age (Asr-ı Saadet) of Islam. For him, what was dominant in this era was reason, truth 
(hakk), bürhan and intellectual consultation (meşveret) (Muh: 33). He contrasts Islam with two 
temporal formations with regard to the place of reason in an ideal Islamic thought. First of all, he 
locates ‘the Islamic past’ to the period between the end of the 12th century and beginning of the 
19th century by naming it mazi (past) and he calls the period after 19th century which would be 
inspired by the first five centuries of Islam as ‘müstakbel’ (future). He claims that mazi which 
was dominated by emotions (hissiyat) had led to the existing pitiful situation of Islam, whereas he 
believes müstakbel, dominated by the reason, will witness the progress of Islam throughout the 
world170 (Muh: 31). This statement instigates the question as to why Islam will dominate in the 
future. This brings the second distinction. For Kürdi, Muslims should enter into the faith through 
reason and bürhan, unlike followers of other religions who are required to abandon rational 
thought in order to enter to the faith (HŞ: 26). This point is significant in Kürdi’s theory of a 
possible existence of an autonomous ethical realm due to his a priori acceptance of an 
autonomous reason able to judge the religious dogma.   
In this context, one metaphor he used can be instructive. Kürdi understands the relation 
between science (fenn) and Islam as the fatherhood of the latter to the former (Muh: 10), 
implying that there is no essential clash between Islam and the true sciences. In this manner, he 
suggests that, the new sciences (maarif-i cedide), which are assumed to carry some properties of 
the modern civilization, require a pure way of entrance into the Islamic world, i.e. through the 
madrasas (Mün: 131), implying that like the modern civilization, the sciences as they exist at that 
moment have to be reformed in their diffusion process.  
However, his position in understanding of Islam’s relation to reason is clear. For him, 
Islam should never base itself upon bigotry, ignorance and non-judgment (adem-i muhakeme) but 
it is appropriation of the truth (iltizam-ı hakk) (Mün: 131), At the moment, what is necessary for 
the Muslims is the courage of reason and science (şecaat-i akliye ve fenniye). As the age is the 
                                                 
170 The full text of this periodization can be found in Appendix IV. 
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age of reason, the courage which is result of reason but not of physical strength is the real power 
of the peoples.  
What is more, in order to improve sciences, an ethics of discussion should enter (DHÖ: 
68). Beside its function in finding the truth, what is significant here is Kürdi’s belief that the 
scientific discussions between the Islamic groups, all admitting the values of searching the truth 
and the true sciences, would bring the unity of Islam (ittihad-ı İslam) (Mün: 32). For him, ittihad 
is possible only through integration of ideas (imtizac-ı efkar) (Mün: 113). For Kürdi, the states 
which depend on the science (ilim) have eternal lives (Mün: 33) due to two factors: first, they try 
to integrate the laws of wisdom (=hikmet, whose one of the first significant components is the 
philosophy) with the laws of the state (HŞ: 98); and second, the dominant features in the 
constitutional states are truth, knowledge (marifet), reason, legality and public opinion (efkar-ı 
amme) (Mün: 33). What this suggests for Kürdi’s possible integration to the contemporary social 
thought is that Kürdi has an understanding of reason instrumental in the establishment of a unity 
through dialogue.  
 
2. THE ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF REASON IN BEDİÜZZAMAN 
It is obvious in Kürdi that he insists upon the necessity of the free application of reason. 
He criticizes ordinary people as their leaders confiscated their reasons (Mün: 104). He also 
mentions the necessity of reason to understand the reality of Koranic verses171 (HŞ: 26). He 
suggests reason and Koranic text (nakil) are always in accordance (Muh: 7), and if they seem to 
contradict each other, reason is considered as the base and nakil is to be interpreted. However, at 
this stage he suggests that this reason should be ‘the reason’172(Muh: 13). This extension helps us 
to understand Kürdi’s understanding of what is true reason.  
For Kürdi, human being is central in the universe due to his ability to explore the art of 
God by his reason and imitate it in his action173 (HŞ: 36), emerges to be the lord of the existence 
                                                 
171 Hem ayat-ı Kur’aniye, başlarında ve ahirlerinde, beşeri aklına havale eder. “Aklına bak”der. 
“Fikrine, kalbine müracaat et, meşveret et, onunla görüş ki, bu hakikatı bilesin” diyor   
172 Akıl ve nakil tearuz ettikleri vakitte, akıl asıl itibar ve nakil te’vil olunur. Fakat o akıl akıl 
gerektir. 
173 Mahlukat içinde en mükerrem, en ehemmiyetli, beşerdir. Çünkü beşer hilkat-i kainattaki zahiri 
esbap ve neticelerinin mabeynindeki basamakları ve teselsül eden illetlerin ve sebeplerin 
münasebetlerini aklıyla keşfedip sanat-ı İlahiyeyi ve muntazam hikmetli icadat-ı Rabbaniyenin 
taklidini sanatçığıyla yapmak; ve ef’al-i İlahiyeyi anlamak için ve sanat-ı İlahiyeyi bilmek ve 
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by his reason (MN: 118), surpasses the angels by his reason alone (İİ: 308). He also believes that 
the Islamic sciences require knowledge on the philosophy of şeriat (a concept derived from the 
ideas of classical Muslim philosophers) and the new philosophy (hikmet-i cedide)174 (Muh: 25). 
Despite these statements, Kürdi also believes that reason by itself and its own principles is too 
weak to understand the existence175 (Rum: 229). This statement is a complete divergence from 
rationalism. He also criticizes the Enlightenment reason operating under the rules of empiricism 
when he says that the philosopher’s reason works on the level of his eye so that he cannot see 
what the soul and the heart can see176 (MN: 202).  
This is not a complete break from the Enlightenment thought as far as, for Kürdi, hikmet-i 
cedide or fünun-u cedide serves to a number of things such as love of truth and humanism, but 
Kürdi seeks the integration of the existing reason and its sciences to the knowledge of God 
(ulum-u kevniyenin ulum-u İlahiyeye istiğrakı) (Rum: 226). For Kürdi, only through the 
integration of the knowledge obtained by reason and the knowledge obtained by the conscience 
(vicdan) and the heart, a person can reach truth (hakikatt) This is a leitmotiv of his works177 
(Mün: 127), (HŞ: 97).  
From this perspective, it is easy to understand the mentality in the ideas below. While he 
claims he traveled in the way of gnosis (marifet) through his reason (MN: 10), Kürdi speaks of 
reason in operation with the realms of heart and conscience. In other words, he claims to reach 
some sort of rational sufism which would be represented in his text in the Republican years. 
However, when he says that reason and sciences do not serve for the afterworld (MN: 180), he 
speaks about the secular reason which operates through only observation of the universe. In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                              
cüz’i ilmiyle ve sanatlarıyla anlamak için, bir mizan, bir mikyas, kendi cüz’i ihtiyariyle işlediği 
maddelerle Halık-ı Zülcelal’in külli, muhit ef’al ve sıfatlarını bilerek, kainatın en eşref, en ekrem 
mahluku beşer olduğunu ispat ediyor.  
 
174 Hadd-i evsatı gösterecek, ifrat ve tefriti kıracak yalnız felsefe-i şeriatle belagat ve mantık ve 
hikmettir.     
175 Nazar-ı akli kendi desatiriyle çok fakirdir ve dardır. Pek çok hakaika karşı kasır olur. 
Kavrayamadığından, “hakikat değil”der, reddeder.    
176 “Şimşek, buhar gibi fenni meseleleri keşfeden feylesoflar, Hakkın esrarını, Kur’an nurlarını da 
keşfedebilirler” diyemezsin. Zira, onun aklı gözündedir. Göz ise kalb ve ruhun gördüklerini 
göremez. Çünkü, kalblerinde can kalmamıştır; gaflet, o kalbleri tabiat bataklığında çürütmüştür.  
177 Vicdanın ziyası ulum-u diniyedir. Aklın nuru fünun-u medeniyedir. İkisinin imtizacıyla 
hakikat tecelli eder… İftirak ettikleri vakit birincisinde taassup, ikincisinde hile, şüphe tevellüd 
eder.  
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for Kürdi, the link between reason and observation is essential178 (Muh: 113), and what Kürdi 
tries to do is to extend the definition of observation (müşahedat) to spiritual and heartly realms. 
This extension is the spiritual relation with God, in which the Enlightenment and Kürdi’s Islam 
diverges. For him, the main difference between the philosopher and Koran is the former’s vision 
of the universe by itself whereas the latter’s vision of the universe as a sign to God’s existence, 
His unity and names.  
It seems to be that the impact of Enlightenment thought on Kürdi’s notion of reason is of 
great importance. He considers reason as itself very significant and its application as in the 
Enlightenment thinkers necessary for the Islamic progress. However, he is conscious of the 
problem that Enlightenment reason itself is alien to the Islamic cultural parameters and so tries to 
transform it to the language of Islam. At that moment, reason starts to gain a meaning depending 
more on the Islamic conceptions of the reason than of the Enlightenment. However, what is 
significant is, Kürdi does not deny the Enlightenment reason but preserves it as one facet of his 
understanding of true reason. The same thing happens to the concept of nature, now that I will 
concentrate upon.  
  
3. WHAT IS NATURE ACCORDING TO BEDİÜZZAMAN? 
For Kürdi, reason merely observing the universe essentially falls into naturalism. Reason 
sees the order and lawfulness in the phenomena within the universe and links it to the existence 
of a set of principles which are assumed to be eternal. This existence, based on a set of laws is 
called ‘the nature’. For Kürdi, the problem is that philosophy considers the universe for itself 
(mana-yı ismi) whereas the Koran looks the universe signifying its creator (mana-yı harfi) (MN: 
196). As far as the universe is at the center, philosophy cannot comprehend the realm of God’s 
direct voluntary impact on the universe (melekut) but is limited to the realm of the world of 
phenomena where causality operates (mülk)179 (Sün: 151).  
                                                 
178 (İnsanın) hükm-ü aklisi de daima üss-ül esası, müşahedattan neş’et eder. 
179 Kainatın iki ciheti var. Ayinenin iki vechi gibi. Biri mülk biri melekutiyet. Mülk ciheti 
ezdadın cevelangahıdır. Hüsün kubh, hayır şer, sağir kebir gibi umurun mahall-I tevarüdüdür. 
Onun için vesait ve esbab vazedilmiş, ta dest-i kudret zahiren umur-u hasise ile mübaşir olmasın. 
Azamet, izzet öyle ister. Hakiki te’sir verilmemiş., vahdet öyle ister.  
Melekutiyet ciheti ise, mutlaka şeffafedir, teşahhusat karışmaz. O cihet vasıtasız Halıka 
müteveccihtir. Terettüb, teselsül yoktur. İlliyet maluliyet giremez. İ’vicacatı yoktur. Avaik 
müdahale edemez. Zerre şemse kardeş olur.     
 49 
Kürdi does not reject the concept of nature. What he tries to do is instead locate nature in 
a position acceptable to the Islamic discourse. The term holy law (şeriat) plays an axial role in 
this attempt. Kürdi claims that there are two types of şeriats excerpted from Koranic mentality. 
The first is the known şeriat whose source is the Holy Speech (kelam) of God and which rules 
voluntary acts of human beings, whereas the second is the holy law of creation (şeriat-ı fıtriye) 
which rules the operation of the universe as a whole180 (HŞ: 110).  
   Kürdi considers this formulation necessary due to the need to answer the Western 
triumph over the universe and provide the necessary epistemological background for 
appropriating this naturalistic vision of the universe without shaking the foundations of Islamic 
creed. Then şeriat-ı fıtriye becomes instrumental in grasping the naturalistic outlook. Kürdi 
insists upon the sciences (fenn) as proof of the existence of universal laws implying universal 
order which is a proof of God (Muh: 35) and of His şeriat-ı fıtriye (Muh: 50).  
Then, for Kürdi, what is called the nature is an art of God and His şeriat-ı fıtriye; the 
universal laws (nevamis) are its issues and the powers (kuva), its decrees (İİ: 171). What is 
significant here is that the imagination of nature in its relation to God is the metaphor of a state 
ruled by a constitution. The ruler (God) rules the state (the universe) through universal laws 
(natural laws) which are essentially voluntary but at the same time abiding and systematic. 
Through this conception, a work on Nature is an attempt to understand God’s rules in the 
universe.     
As far as nature is a constitution which exists inasmuch as the lawmaker (God) permits its 
existence, the real being of nature and its rules are something conditional (itibari) (MN: 123, İİ: 
171, Muh: 107) and non-eternal (hadis) (HŞ: 113). The nature only exists in its relation to God, 
and as far as God decides to act contradictory to His universal laws, he is able to do so. However, 
even in the case of the miracles, Kürdi speaks of a causality transcending the material 
understanding of nature. For him, miracles are essential to apply the rule of general reason (külli 
                                                 
 
180 Şeriat ikidir: 
Birincisi: Alem-i asgar olan insanın ef’al ve ahvalini tanzim eden ve sıfat-ı kelamdan gelen 
bildiğimiz şeriattır. 
İkincisi: İnsan-ı ekber olan alemin harekat ve sekenatını tanzim eden, sıfat-ı iradeden gelen 
şeriat-ı kübra-i fıtriyedir ki, bazen yanlış olarak tabiat tesmiye edilir.  
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akıl) within the societies181 (İİ: 163). In other words, even miracles do not arbitrarily destroy 
şeriat-ı fıtriye, rather they may be considered in a more comprehensive view of causality. The 
understanding of soul in Kürdi also reflects his enthusiasm about law and order in the universe. 
For Kürdi, the spirit is also a universal law having consciousness (namus-u zişuur)182 (HŞ: 95). 
Then, human’s voluntary action, as much as God’s volition, play in a ground where universal 
laws operate. However, neither of them can be claimed to be under the control of laws because in 
Kürdi’s view, these laws generate from God, and the soul itself is a natural law.   
The understanding of nature in Kürdi provides a good example for his hermeneutical 
relation to modernity. He tries to grasp the concept of nature, which emerged in a different 
cultural climate, and reconditionalize it in a different cultural outlook. For this reason, he uses 
concepts of the Islamic culture (like şeriat-ı fıtriye) and fits the concept of the nature in a 
worldview in which the conception of God is still important. The question why he felt the need to 
transform the concept of the nature can be answered by his belief in the fact that Western material 
power in the world had sourced from their rule over nature. Then, Kürdi’s consideration of 
Western power necessitated in him internalization of the conception of nature.   
  
C. THE ŞERİAT AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT AND ISLAMIC COMMUNITY 
 As in the realms of civilization and reason, Bediüzzaman translates the concepts of nation 
and social contract into Islamic epistemology. This effort is partly influenced by Western 
intellectual domination, partly by an hermeneutical interaction with modernity. In addition, it is 
partly a product of the elaboration on the concepts and understandings provided by the classical 
Islamic heritage.  
 The inquiry should start with the Islamic understanding of man in its essential relation to 
the society. Kürdi presents this idea as the civilized nature of human being (medeni-i bi’t-tab) 
(HŞ: 51). Then he constructs society in the fashion of a social contract theory183 (İİ: 162-3). In 
                                                 
181 (Külli aklın temsilcisi olarak Peygamberin) Halık ile olan derece-i münasebet ve alakasını 
göstermek için de, bir delile ihtiyacı vardır. Böyle bir delil de ancak mu’cizelerdir.   
182 Ruh, bir kanun-u zivucud-u haricidir, bir namus-u zişuurdur. Sabit ve daim fıtri kanunlar gibi, 
ruh dahi alem-i emirden, sıfat-ı iradeden gelmiş; kudret ona vücud-u hissi giydirmiştir… Mevcut 
ruh, makul kanunun kardeşidir. İkisi, hem daimi, hem alem-i emirden gelmişlerdir.          
183 This text can be found in Appendix V.  
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fact, this kind of a social contract is a legacy from al-Ghazzali184; however, it becomes 
instrumentalized just after the influence of Western intellectualism. 
 According to Kürdi, human being is created with a constitution to seek for perfection for 
in an infinite number of needs of life. For this reason, human being searches for limitless arts and 
necessitates relation with other human beings. These searches and necessities lead to the 
construction of society. Up to this point, the construction of society is completely secular and 
comprises all human beings. However, once society is constructed and as there is no limit to the 
central spiritual powers of human beings (kuvve-i şeheviye, kuvve-i gadabiye, kuvve-i akliye) the 
society faces oppression. There starts a search for justice which cannot be obtained from 
‘particular’ reasons, and the society experiences the emergence of a general reason (akl-ı külli) 
which presents itself through law (kanun) and, in fact, which is şeriat. What is significant is that 
the şeriat is only applicable through a Prophet, in this case Muhammad, who builds the society. 
This model is the ideal type of construction of a society.   
 Then, for Kürdi, there exists in reality only one Islamic society, which is the Islamic 
nation. By its nature, the Islamic nation has a transcendental dimension185 (HŞ: 56) which 
completely diverges from the Western understanding of nation. The latter one is an end in itself, 
or an idol to which the Westerner worships186 (MN: 96). The other point of divergence is that the 
constructive principle of the Islamic nation is “love” (muhabbet). For Kürdi, muhabbet is a basic 
character of Islam187 (HŞ: 46). For this reason he tries to avoid hatred against Westerners as far as 
they do not oppress others188 (HŞ: 45). In this aspect Kürdi contrasts the formation of societies of 
Muslims against of Westerners. For him, the Islamic nation is a result of inner love among 
members of the same religion, country and class (HŞ: 102) whereas Western nations are products 
of hatred towards others (Sün: 144). He calls this type of nationalism as negative nationalism 
(menfi milliyet) (HŞ: 102).  
                                                 
184 Kurtoğlu, Op.cit. pp. 223-5. 
185 Hamiyet-i İslamiye, en kuvvetli ve metin ve Arştan gelmiş bir zincir-i nuranidir, kırılmaz ve 
kopmaz bir urvetü’l-vüskadır, tahrib edilmez, mağlub olmaz bir kudsi kal’adır.   
186 Asabiyet-i cahiliye, birbirine tesanüd edip yardım eden, gaflet dalalet, riya ve zulmetten 
mürekkep bir macundur. Bunun için milliyetçiler milliyeti mabud ittihaz ediyorlar. Hamiyet-i 
İslamiye ise, nur-u imandan in’ikas edip dalgalanan bir ziyadır.        
187 Muhabbet, uhuvvet, sevmek İslamiyetin mizacıdır, rabıtasıdır. 
188 Öyle ise, düşmanlarımızın seyyiatı, tecavüz olmamak şartıyla, adavetinizi celp etmesin. 
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 With its transcendental nature, Kürdi is conscious of the Islamic nation’s character as an 
imagined community. It is not the language, blood, or history that shapes the nation but the 
common faith of the Muslims. Its members are the totality of Muslims throughout centuries and 
their leader is Prophet Muhammad189 (DHÖ: 47). The purpose of the Islamic nation is to educate 
the self for the hereafter, and prayer is a crucial act for this purpose (MN: 66). Then, for Kürdi, 
the Islamic nation is a one single tribe (HŞ: 47). By the revival of liberty in the Islamic lands, 
each Muslim will understand that he is bound by this strong bond of the  Islamic nation (Mün: 
64).  
 How does Kürdi integrate the emerging Turkish, Arabic, and Kurdish nationalisms within 
the Islamic lands? For him, the real (hakiki) nation is single: Islam. In other words, it is the spirit 
of the existing nationalisms. Other nationalisms have only relational existences (nisbi ve izafi) but 
not absolute existences (Mün: 24). Whereas religious devotion (hamiyet-i diniye) comprises both 
the commoners and the elite, nationalist devotion (hamiyet-i milliye) guides only the elite (HŞ: 
55). Even for this reason alone, hamiyet-i milliye should be only a buttress for hamiyet-i diniye, 
but not an alternative. 
 Kürdi is very clear when he claims that Islamic national identity can never be separated 
from the definitions of Turkhood and Arabhood (HŞ: 56). And as far as hamiyet-i diniye and 
hamiyet-i milliye are complementary, he does not object to hamiyet-i milliye (DHÖ: 58). Even he 
himself does not hesitate to reveal Kürdish nationalistic ideas in accordance with Islamic 
nationalism190 (DHÖ: 93-4). But what he seeks from the centrality of Islamic nationalism is to 
bring a victorious future for the Islamic civilization. For him, the sole cure for the continent of 
Asia is the unity of Islam (ittihad-ı İslam) (HŞ: 92). It is the reconciliation of Arabs and Turks 
which will and bring the victory of the Koran (HŞ: 40). The rationale behind that is Kürdi’s belief 
that what would instigate progress in the East is religious sentiment, rather than the rational one 
(HŞ: 55). For Kürdi, the Islamic religion by its rationality and transcendental nature gives a huge 
psychological power to its member (Mün: 100) which is the source of Islam’s power in totality. 
For this reason, the owner of the future will be the Islamic nation (HŞ: 59). 
 
 
                                                 
 
189 This text will be presented in Appendix II. 
190 This interesting and unknown text is in Appendix III. 
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D. FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN BEDİÜZZAMAN 
 
 Bediüzzaman’s understanding of freedom is also a case for hermeneutical relation with 
modernity. Freedom as a concept, which is translated from the Enlightenment thought in the 
modern Islamic political theory, is central to Kürdi’s social theory. However, its meaning 
ascribed is completely an Islamic one. Throughout his formulation of freedom, he also criticizes 
the Western conception of freedom, a necessity for an Islamic intellectual in his effort to confront 
the Western hegemony.  
 Kürdi formulates freedom through a denial of oppression (istibdat) of all kind, which is 
alleged to destroy human’s spiritual existence (Mün: 22) and the domination of oppression in the 
Islamic world obstructed Islam’s progress (HŞ: 21). This is because of the ontological fact that 
freedom is a gift to human beings from God (HŞ: 53). This gift enables them to understand God’s 
names (MN: 167) and apply God’s law in the universe due to their position as God’s caliphs in 
the world (İİ: 313).  
 Kürdi claims that only a faithful man can be truly free in the universe and presents a 
metaphor to strengthen his claim. A child who plays near a railway and sees the train coming, 
never loses his bravery and freedom because he knows since the train obeys law and order, and it 
can never destroy the railway and threaten him. But even Hercules or Rustem without knowledge 
of law and order would perceive the train as a giant coming to attack them. They necessarily 
would become frightened of the train and lose their freedom. For Kürdi, true faith gives the 
believer the knowledge that every thing in the world serves God’s purpose and there is no power 
beside His. This knowledge brings security to the believer and in this case, freedom has meaning 
in life. Otherwise, the infidel would regard the world as a realm full of enemies, which 
ontologically destroys his freedom191 (HŞ: 56-8). 
 It is significant that Kürdi locates freedom as the purpose of the revelation of şeriat192 
(Mün: 37). This freedom is necessarily a civilized one: true freedom is possible only by 
civilization, knowledge (marifet), virtue and Islam (DHÖ: 60). He defines freedom by denial of 
                                                 
191 This text is presented in Appendix VI. 
192 Sual: Şu pis istibdat ne vakitten beri başlamış geliyor? 
Cevap: İnsanlar hayvanlıktan çıkıp geldiği vakit, nasılsa bunu da beraber getirmiştir. 
…Sual: Sonra? 
Cevap: Şeriat-ı Garra zemine nüzul etti; ta ki, zeminin yüzünü temiz ve insaniyetin yüzünü ak 
etsin, şu insaniyetten siyah lekesini izale etsin.     
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any form of oppression. This definition requires not to oppress, not to be oppressed and positive 
freedom (Mün: 55). By the notion “positive freedom” Kürdi means that one should not be 
oppressed by his ego and his desires. This type of freedom is considered as a necessary 
component of freedom in general because of the fact that ego is also entrusted to man by God 
(MN: 58) and it should serve to God (MN: 89). Therefore, freedom in Kürdi gains an 
instrumental meaning in its aspect to destroy all boundaries for worship to God. Inasmuch as 
worship includes worldly happiness also, for Kürdi, freedom is the door to Heaven for the Islamic 
world (DHÖ: 64).  
 I want to deal with components of freedom separately. First, freedom implies not to 
oppress. Kürdi says that a true faith does not permit the oppression on any thing. Its rationale is 
that everything is a creature of God, and only God has the right to rule over it. The application of 
this mentality to social life according to Kürdi is that the only form of legitimate power is the rule 
of law (Mün: 57). If the rule of law is not applied, Kürdi claims, oppression will expand (DHÖ: 
77). According to Kürdi, if oppression is avoided, through interactions within the society, 
individuals perceive the fact that they form a nation, and their endeavor (himmet) will strengthen, 
in the end giving birth to the individual entrepreneur (DHÖ: 87). In the intellectual domain, 
Bediüzzaman believes, by freedom in general and by freedom of thought in particular, the 
Islamic world will give rise to geniuses such as Descartes and Plato (DHÖ: 88-9). 
 Freedom also requires not to be oppressed. Kürdi claims that attachment to God through 
faith necessarily denies oppression by others, because a servant of God cannot obey anyone else 
(DHÖ: 74). Aside from the political authorities, even the religious leaders such as sheikhs should 
not apply any form of power and domination193 (Mün: 59-60). Furthermore, Kürdi implies a 
criticism to place of the classical Islamic works in the Islamic society through claiming that they 
have become shadows on Koran’s message (Sün: 158).  
 Kürdi understands positive freedom as serving spiritual desires (hüda) (Sün: 167), but not 
bodily ones (heva ve heves). The former, he believes, brings unity (DHÖ: 77). Kürdi criticizes 
medeniyet-i hazıra as it serves the bodily desires of man (Sün: 166). For him this is the 
oppression of ego which, if dominant, destroys law and order (DHÖ: 45), and even if it may 
                                                 
193 Sual: “Bir büyük adama, bir veliye, bir şeyhe ve bir büyük alime karşı nasıl hür olacağız? 
Onlar, meziyetleri için bize tahakküm etmek haklarıdır. Biz onların faziletlerinin esiriyiz.” 
Cevap: Velayetin, şeyhliğin, büyüklüğün şe’ni, tevazu ve mahviyettir; tekebbür ve tahakküm 
değildir. Demek, tekebbür eden, sabiyy-i müteşeyyihtir; siz de büyük tanımayınız.    
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bring a denial of one’s oppression, it may bring limitless, uncountable oppressions (DHÖ: 85). 
Then freedom should be restricted only by Şeriat. The şeriat would be both a restriction and an 
adornment of freedom (DHÖ: 80) due to the fact that, for Kürdi, şeriat would show the individual 
the purposes of free action. By this, baddies of civilization would not enter into the Islamic world 
(HŞ: 52).  
 It should also be mentioned that for Kürdi, freedom of the whole (hürriyet-i umumi) is the 
totality of individual freedoms (Mün: 55). This is some sort of individualism, however not an 
individualism of a selfish kind (Mün: 137). I should also remind his phrase that man is naturally 
civilized. However, in two aspects, Kürdi seems to be deeply individualistic: first, depending on a 
Koranic verse, Kürdi claims that one single individual’s right cannot be disregarded even for the 
most general benefit (Sün: 147). Kürdi permits such neglect only if a collective spirit emerges 
creating a hidden consent by the individual.  
 The second and most important aspect of his individualism is freedom of thought, in his 
case, especially of religious thought. He glorifies Kürdistan for its nature permitting freedom of 
thought and expression194 (DHÖ: 62). In religious thought, his tolerance for different views 
depends on his understanding of Koran. For Bediüzzaman, the Koranic message having multiple 
meanings (Rum: 226) making numerous interpretations legitimate (Rum: 227). Thus, Kürdi 
condemns any form of intellectual oppression as the father of imitation (taklid) (Mün: 22) 
condemned according to the Islamic value system. So, for him, any talented individual can judge 
(içtihad) in religious affairs (HŞ: 96). Even though his içtihad may diverge from orthodoxy, as far 
as his içtihad contains the seeds of truth, he has the right to continue his ideas (Tul: 187).    
 
E. HISTORY AND PROGRESS IN BEDİÜZZAMAN 
 Bediüzzaman also derives the concept of progress (terakki) from Enlightenment thought, 
but contextualizes it in a distinct cultural background. By positing Islam in his understanding of 
historical progress, he resists Western cultural domination. Lastly, Kürdi instrumentalizes his 
view of progress in order to buttress his social purpose: to provide the ethical and epistemological 
background of the future true civilization, Islam.  
                                                 
194 (İstanbul’da) göremediğim hürriyet-i fikir ve serbestiyet-i kelam… Kürdistan dağlarında tam 
manasıyla hokum-fermadır.   
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 Kürdi grounds his claim as history is a progress through three main theses. First of all, he 
believes the universe obeys the rule of evolution to a telos. Man in the universe has also his 
evolution through accumulation and sharing of knowledge (telahuk-u efkar)195 (Muh: 16). 
Secondly, depending on an Islamic metaphysics and supporting it through his perception on the 
nature of sciences, he claims the order in the universe that is explored by the sciences suggests 
the absolute goodness of the universe (HŞ: 35). The very special place of human in the universe 
suggests that the human is the most beautiful creature in the universe (HŞ: 36). Then, for him, 
humanity will taste an ideal world through the course of history (HŞ: 38). The third source of his 
claim is derived from Marxism. Kürdi believes humanity has passed four social stages, exactly 
the same as Marxist ones196 (RNK 1: 325), and is traveling to the phase of complete freedom and 
ownership (serbestiyet ve malikiyet) which will be the last stage of humanity (Mek: 353). The 
point is Kürdi completely shares the Enlightenment ideal of history of human kind as an overall 
progress.  
 Kürdi also conceptualizes time within a relationship to European history. His separation 
of the past (mazi) and the future (istikbal) of the entire world reveals this effect of modernity. For 
him, in Europe istikbal started in the 15th century (Muh: 31), the beginning of the Renaissance. 
He claims istikbal started in the Islamic world in the 19th century (Muh: 31), which is, not 
coincidentally, the phase of entrance of modernity into Islamic world. In his understanding of 
history, he suggests istikbal will be dominated by Islam which is the grand humanism (insaniyet-i 
kübra) which will succeed mehasin-i medeniyet that is sourced from Europe197 (Muh: 34).  
 The distinction between mazi and istikbal is crucial, inasmuch as these ages have 
essentially distinct characteristics. İstikbal is the domination of reason, knowledge, love, and 
sciences, whereas mazi is defined by emotions, bigotry, hatred, and oppression (Muh: 32). In this 
sense, he believes, in istikbal, philosophy should be studied due to the necessities of istikbal even 
though the past masters (e.g. el-Ghazzali) had banned it (Muh: 25). In the same sense, Kürdi’s 
ideal state is the utopia of the philosopher Plato (DHÖ: 58), not of, for example, Ibn Taymiya 
                                                 
195 Alemde meylü’l-istikmal vardır. O’nun ile hilkat-i alem, kanun-u tekamüle tabidir. İnsan ise; 
alemin semerat ve eczasından olduğundan, onda dahi meylü’l-istikmalden bir meylü’t-terakki 
mevcuttur. Bu meyl ise telahuk-u efkardan istimdat ile neşv ü nema bulur.     
196 Beşerin başı ihtiyar; edvar-ı hamsesi var. Vahşet ve bedeviyet, memlukiyet, esaret, şimdi dahi 
ecirdir, başlamıştır, geçiyor.        
197 This text on periodization is in Appendix IV. 
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who strictly rejected the philosophers’ endeavors. For Kürdi, however, as istikbal is the age of 
reason, Islam should be defended and presented rationally. 
 Kürdi believes in the underdevelopment of the Islamic world is a reality mainly with 
respect to material progress (HŞ: 21). Spiritually, he perceives mehasin-i medeniyet should 
dominate like the love of truth, humanism and so on, but for him, even Europe as a whole is in 
spiritual crisis, as mentioned in the first section. Then, the urgent problem is the material progress 
and absorption of the values of mehasin-i medeniyet. For him, the 1908 Revolution was really a 
revolution in this sense. 1908 is the Ottoman shift from the Middle Ages to istikbal (Mün: 17). 
Kürdi suggests the medieval states which depend on oppression would demise and the modern 
states depending on science and reason would dominate for eternity (Mün: 33). Kürdi believes 
the colonial experiences of India, Egypt, Caucasus and Turkistan will also be instrumental in the 
Islamic material progress due to the fact that these peoples become aware of civilized rule in their 
rule by the colonialists (Sün: 181-2). Another source of progress is provided from şeriat by Kürdi. 
For him, today, the glorification of God’s name (i’la-yı kelimetullah) a requirement for every 
Muslim can be done only through material progress and entrance to true civilization . The West 
oppresses Muslims spiritually and the Muslim should use the weapons of sciences and arts (fen ve 
sanat) to destroy the enemies of ignorance, poverty and intellectual conflicts198 (DHÖ: 76-7).  
 Kürdi regards religion as essential in development of the Islamic world. He is resolute in 
his idea that Islam will rule the world in the future. For him, Islam is the only religion whose 
creed is rational and in istikbal people search for the true religion, and they could not accept 
nothing but the rational Islam (HŞ: 23-30). His second purpose in insisting upon religion is, 
Kürdi’s belief that the East, the garden of all known prophets, can only be awakened and 
motivated by religious sentiments (DHÖ: 75). However, Kürdi also believes as far as religion 
would change the society in a better way, the şeriat would also expand and show its adaptability 
to different situations199 (DHÖ: 89). Leaving this aspect to the next chapter, it should be said that, 
for Kürdi, progress is the progress of Islamic nation and the truths of şeriat (DHÖ: 58). 
                                                 
198 Biz de fen ve san’at silahıyla i’la-yı Kelimetullah’ın en müthiş düşmanı olan cehil ve fakr ve 
ihtilaf-ı efkarla cihad edeceğiz.   
 
199 Şecere-i meylü’l-istikma-i alemin dalı olan insandaki meylü’t-terakkinin mahsul ve semeresi 
olan istidadın telahuk-u efkarla hasıl olan netaicinin teşerrub ve tegaddi ile büyümesi nisbetinde 
Şeriat-ı Garra aynen maddi zihayat gibi tevessü ve intibak edeceğinden ezelden gelip ebede 
gideceğine bürhan-ı bahirdir.           
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 Bediüzzaman’s view of history in a Marxist framework is a result of socialist movements 
just after the First World War. He believed the real struggle becomes not the wars between 
nations but social classes200 (Sün: 165). Kürdi perceived the Ottoman defeat as its fate to be on 
the side of socialism. He claims, had the Ottomans won the war, they would become more 
capitalist which was contrary to the Islamic essence. Because Islam supports the poor, Islam 
should absorb the socialist thought fitting it into Islam’s spirit201 (Sün: 168). Kürdi says 
Christianity used the weapons of fen and medeniyet against the rest of the world, but the East 
developed a very strong weapon (socialism) which needs a source of holiness in order to effect 
huge masses of people. As it cannot be Christianity, it should integrate with Islam202 (Rum: 233).      
   
 
F. CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 Kürdi believes justice should be inspired by the transcendental. For him, a secular effort 
for justice is bound to collapse due to the fact that particular reasons beside their incapability to 
reach the ethical truth by themselves cannot purify themselves from particular interests in their 
search for justice (HŞ: 64). What is more, only sacred law can diffuse in the peoples’ each faculty 
comprising reason, heart, conscience and so on203 (HŞ: 65). Then as a part of justice, the political 
system of the Islamic world should be derived from the Islamic sources. What is at the hand is 
constitutionalism coming from Europe, Bediüzzaman claims its essence can be rooted into 
Islamic thought and derived from the principles of the existing Islamic legal schools (DHÖ: 45). 
Bediüzzaman accepts constitutionalism only through an Islamic filter (DHÖ: 44). 
 Kürdi believes the future of the Islamic world depends on acceptance of constitutionalist 
states due to the attributes he gives to it (HŞ: 52). Depending on some Koranic verses, Kürdi even 
claims the spirit of constitutionalism exists in the şeriat (Mün: 38). However this understanding, 
                                                 
200 Devletler, milletler muharebesi, tabakat-ı beşer muharebesine terk-i mevki ediyor. Zira beşer 
esir olmak istemediği gibi, ecir olmak da istemez.  
201 Alem-i İslam şu ikinci cereyana (socialism, EA) karşı lakayd veya muarız kalmakla; hem 
istinadsız, hem bütün emeğini heder, hem onun istilasıyla istihaleye maruz kalmaktan ise, akılane 
davranıp onu İslami bir tarza çevirip, kendine hadim kılmaktır.         
202 Cumhur-u avama müteveccih olan bir fikir bir kudsiyet almaz ise söner. O desatire (socialism, 
EA) kudsiyet verecek iki muazzam rakib-i din var. Şu keskin fikir gözünü açtığı vakit hasmını ve 
hasmının elindeki silahını hrıstiyanlık dini bulmuştur. Öyle ise o fikir kudsiyet almak için 
İslamiyet’e dehalet etmeye mecburdur.    
203 This text is in Appendix VI. 
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for Kürdi, requires the abandonment of reading Koran based on its appearance. For him, in the 
post-1908 period, there are two types of people demanding the rule of şeriat: the ones wrongly 
insisting on the appearance of Koran (zahirperests) and the ones who deliberately try to settle the 
constitutionalist system into the şeriat, one of whom was Bediüzzaman himself204 (Mün: 41).  
 For Kürdi, constitutionalism is mainly justice, consultation (meşveret), and restriction of 
power205 (DHÖ: 77). These aspects, respectively, refer to (1) the rule of law (DHÖ: 77), (2) 
parliamentarism and sovereignty of nation (hakimiyet-i milliye)206 (Mün: 42), and (3) perception 
of government as a servant to the people207 (Mün: 79). The rule of law naturally brings the 
freedom of people (DHÖ: 94) and freedom through constitutionalism evolves the man through a 
real human existence (Mün: 23). Bediüzzaman glorifies the Kurds by telling them that they have 
the constitutionalist nature due to their preserving their individualities and freedoms in their 
communities (DHÖ: 94). Kürdi assumes that the rule of law means also the immutability of law, 
i.e. şeriat. Kürdi suggests the şeriat presents a huge number of alternative ways of action but the 
essence of it, the Islamic constitution, cannot be changed. What the ruler may do is to choose 
from the alternatives208 (Mün: 41-2). But what is significant is Kürdi believes only the one 
thousandth of şeriat deals with politics and if it is necessary, neglect of this part does not mean 
disobedience to şeriat209 (Mün: 53). What is necessary is only to preserve the constitutional 
principle: the official religion is Islam. This insistence depends on the acceptance of national 
sovereignty, the nation, which is Islam (Mün: 53).  
 Then, what does national sovereignty bring with itself? Kürdi’s conception of national 
sovereignty depends on his idea of freedom. Freedom brings the rule of public opinion (efkar-ı 
umumi) (Mün: 24), and public opinion brings national sovereignty (Mün: 42). By national 
sovereignty, the people become the sultan and the government becomes the servant of it (Mün: 
                                                 
204 Demek şeriatı isteyenler iki kısımdır: Biri muvazene ile zarureti nazara alarak, mudakkikane 
meşrutiyeti şeriata tatbik etmek istiyor. Diğeri de muvazanesiz, zahirperestane, çıkılmaz bir yola 
sapıyor. 
205 Meşrutiyet ki, adalet ve meşveret ve kanunda inhisar-ı kuvvetten ibarettir. Onüç asır evvel 
şeriat-ı garra teessüs ettiğinden…  
206 Meşrutiyet hakimiyet-i millettir. Yani efkar-ı ammenizin missal-i mücessemi olan mebusan 
hakimdir.   
207 Meşrutiyet doğru olursa, kaymakam ve vali reis değiller, belki ücretli hizmetkarlardır.  
208 Amma ahkam ve hukuk ise, zaten tebeddül etmez; tatbikat ve tercihattır ki, meşverete ihtiyaç 
gösterir. 
209 Şeriat-ı Garra’nın bin kısmından bir kısmıdır ki, siyasete taalluk eder. O kısmın ihmaliyle, 
şeriat ihmal olunmaz.    
 60 
79). The personification of the national sovereignty is the parliament. However, Kürdi suggests a 
system of two parliaments, members of each elected by the nation. The right to make law 
depends on the parliament which reflects the ideal of caliphate of the Ottoman state. This 
parliament is composed of religious experts from various Islamic legal schools having the ability 
to perform içtihad (Mün: 80). This is the corporate institute (şahs-ı manevi) which is the source 
of interpretation of the constitution, Koran, for state affairs. The second parliament is the place 
where the practical issues are discussed and the alternative decisions provided by the first 
parliament are handled. Whereas the first parliament reflects the caliphate, the second parliament 
is the reflection of sultanate. Kürdi believes, in the Ottoman case, sultanate and caliphate are 
inseparable (Sün: 161) and the personification of these two şahs-ı manevis, the padişah should 
only have a symbolic power, depending on the solidification of national sovereignty, the 
parliaments210 (MN: 87).  
 National sovereignty also carries the idea of legitimate disobedience. In two categories, 
Bediüzzaman does not hesitate to condemn the ruler, saying if the sultan performs tyranny he 
should not be obeyed (DHÖ: 44). Secondly, Bediüzzaman suggests the sultan should obey the 
şeriat in order to take the title of caliph implying a legitimate disobedience if he does not211 
(DHÖ: 44). However, in the realm of high politics, Kürdi believes that ordinary people (avam) 
should not question this realm because they do not know raison d’etat (hikmet-i hükümet) (DHÖ: 
44). Kürdi says he became happy when the 31 March incident occured because the şeriat would 
rule (DHÖ: 50). However, he was at the same time depressed because the obedience of soldiers 
was destroyed in 31 March. For Kürdi, the army is the center of the Islamic society because its 
duty is glorification of God’s name in the world (i’la-yı kelimetullah) (DHÖ: 49), and obedience 
to commanders is a principle of the şeriat (DHÖ: 50). The belief in army’s centrality in the 
                                                 
210 Şu inkılab-ı azimin temel taşları sağlam gerek. Şu meclis-i alinin (TBMM, EA) şahsiyet-i 
maneviyesi, sahip olduğu kuvvet cihetiyle, mana-i saltanatı deruhte etmiştir. Eğer şeair-i 
İslamiyeyi bizzat imtisal etmek ve ettirmekle, mana-i hilafeti dahi vekaleten deruhte etmezse 
…(millet), bilmecburiye, mana-i hilafeti tamamen kabul ettiğiniz isme ve lafza verecek. O 
manayı idame için kuvveti dahi verecek. Halbuki, meclis elinde bulunmayan ve meclis tarikiyla 
olmayan böyle bir kuvvet, inşıkak-ı asaya sebebiyet verecektir. …Zaman cemaat zamanıdır. 
Cemaatin ruhu olan şahs-ı manevi daha metindir… Halife-i şahsi, ancak ona istinad ile vezaifi 
deruhde edebilir.   
211 İstibdad, zulüm ve tahakkümdür. Meşrutiyet, adalet ve Şeriattır. Padişah, ne vakit 
Peygamberimizin (A.S.M.) ermine itaat etse ve yoluna gitse halifedir. Biz de ona itaat edeceğiz. 
Yoksa, zulüm edenler, padişah da olsa hayduttur. 
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Islamic society is in accordance with Kürdi’s understanding of freedom. For him, freedom of the 
Muslim has a transcendental telos of ruling the universe through God’s law, and the army seems 
to be the focus of it as its purpose is to enable the domination of Islam in the world.  
 Another issue in national sovereignty is the relation between the political center and the 
periphery. Kürdi believes, in the constitutional state the focus should be the periphery. Their 
demands should be analyzed at their locations by MPs and the state should serve the periphery 
through responding the ideas of the peripheral deputies (Mün: 24-6). This aspect also necessitates 
political participation212 (Mün: 31). What Kürdi suggests is the ethical premises of such a 
participatory state are truth, love, non-discrimination (DHÖ: 55), reason and knowledge (Mün: 
33). 
 Even though the state in Bediüzzaman’s mind has an official religion, Kürdi suggests 
non-Muslims should have equality with Muslims before law. He supports even the idea that non-
Muslims have the right to be governors as the government is the servant of people (Mün: 79), and 
have the right to enter the parliament as MPs as they can serve in social issues dealing with the 
public interest (Mün: 41).  
 
G. CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this chapter was to present the social thought of Bediüzzaman which has a 
direct impact on his consideration of ethics. My claim is that Kürdi constructed an Islamic 
Enlightenment through his interaction with the modern Western thought. He did not imitate the 
West, nor did he completely derive these central concepts above from the Islamic texts. What 
happened is that modernity instigated and compelled some concepts, and Kürdi filled the content 
of these concepts with the tools provided by Islamic culture. He saw the classical heritage 
sufficient for answering the challenge of modernity. In Bediüzzaman’s case, the Enlightenment 
tried to re-link to the Transcendental. The central distinction is the location of reason in the 
Christian and the Islamic worlds. Christianity denied the reason in the last instance which 
                                                 
212 Sual: “Meşrutiyeti pekçok i’zam ediyorsun. Eskide rey-i vahid idi, milletten sual yok idi; 
şimdi meşverettir, milletten sual edilir. Millet, ‘Ne için?’ der; ona ‘Ne istersin?’ denilir, işte bu 
kadar. Daha nadir, o kadar ilaveyi takıyorsun?” 
Cevap: Zaten şu nokta bütün cevaplarımı tazammun etmiş. Zira meşrutiyet hükümete düştüğü 
vakit, fikr-i hürriyet meşrutiyeti her vecihle uyandırır. Her nevide, her taifede onun sanatına ait 
bir nevi meşrutiyeti tevlid eder. Hatta ulemada, medariste, talebede bir nevi meşrutiyeti intaç 
eder. Evet, her taifeye ona mahsus bir meşrutiyet, bir teceddüt ilham olunuyor.       
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necessitated the denial of Christianity when reason dominated, but as the Scripture of Islam 
justifies itself through reason, Kürdi’s attempt of relocating the Enlightenment in the religion in a 
different context, Islam seems to be meaningful.  
 The next thing to do is, within the framework of this social theory, to elaborate on how 
Kürdi formulated the Şeriat213 depending on his social thought. How did he rearranged the Şeriat 
in not losing the sovereignty of the transcendental over mundane but answering the needs of the 
modern life which is formulated in this chapter? In this aspect, my question is: was Kürdi able to 
reconstruct the ethical realm both serving to secular and transcendental needs through giving a 
rational telos to the Şeriat?  
                                                 
213 As far as I signify Bediüzzaman’s understanding of şeriat, I will use capital ‘Ş’: Şeriat. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
 METHODOLOGY OF FIKIH  
 
 
 
 
 The previous chapter is designed to reveal the pre-fıkıh positioning of Said-i Kürdi: it is 
the social thought based on the manifestation of humankind’s existence as caliph of God on Earth 
in the age of modernity. This social thought is the perspective of Bediüzzaman in formulating 
Islamic law and ethics. Some points desire to be reminded as an introduction to Kürdi’s 
understanding of the Şeriat. 
 Firstly, Bediüzzaman starts with the assumption that the Şeriat is the most virtuous 
civilization (medeniyet-i fuzla). This seems to be a conscious statement in its implication that 
Şeriat is the perfection of the principles of the modern civilization214 (DHÖ: 58).Another 
implication is that the Şeriat is rooted in reason (medine-i fazıla-i Eflatuniye). This brings us to 
the second important dimension: Bediüzzaman assumes the ontological priority of ‘the reason’ 
over revelation215 (Muh: 7, 13). Thirdly, Bediüzzaman conceives the Şeriat as a perfect system of 
law. This is implied in his identification of the Şeriat with the laws of the nature216 (HŞ: 110). 
What is more, this system of law has a telos: true freedom217 (Mün: 37). Thus, the Şeriat with a 
                                                 
214 İslamiyet, insaniyet-i kübra ve Şeriat, medeniyet-i fuzla olduğundan Alem-i İslamiyet, 
medine-i fazıle-i Eflatuniye olmağa sezadır. 
215 Öyle bir şeriat ki: Akıl ve nakil dest-bedest ittifak vererek ol şeriatın hakaikinin hakkaniyetini 
tasdik etmişlerdir. 
Akıl ve nakil tearuz ettikleri vakitte, akıl asıl itibar ve nakil te’vil olunur. Fakat o akıl, akıl 
gerektir. 
216Şeriat ikidir: 
Birincisi: Alem-i asgar olan insanın ef’al ve ahvalini tanzim eden ve sıfat-ı kelamdan gelen 
bildiğimiz şeriattır. 
İkincisi: İnsan-ı ekber olan alemin harekat ve sekenatını tanzim eden, sıfat-ı iradeden gelen 
şeriat-ı kübra-i fıtriyedir ki, bazen yanlış olarak tabiat tesmiye edilir.  
217 Sual: Şu pis istibdat ne vakitten beri başlamış geliyor? 
Cevap: İnsanlar hayvanlıktan çıkıp geldiği vakit, nasılsa bunu da beraber getirmiştir. 
…Sual: Sonra? 
Cevap: Şeriat-ı Garra zemine nüzul etti; ta ki, zeminin yüzünü temiz ve insaniyetin yüzünü ak 
etsin, şu insaniyetten siyah lekesini izale etsin.     
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telos is completely different from the literal investigation of the Scripture: it is dynamic218 (DHÖ: 
89).  
 This system of presuppositions require certain properties in Bediüzzaman’s understanding 
of fıkıh. First of all, contemplation on fıkıh should be followed by rational determination of the 
social fact. This is the step where, also, rationality of an Islamic decree is searched for. 
Rationality of fıkıh necessarily supposes the conditionality, and following it, historicity of Islamic 
fıkıh. Conditionality and historicity are, in fact, components of the telos of the Şeriat. This is a 
telos which gives the Şeriat its holism. This chapter is planned to investigate this system on the 
examples of içtihad by Said-i Kürdi.  
 
A. RATIONALITY OF THE ŞERİAT 
Bediüzzaman suggests that in order to understand Islam accurately, what is required is 
knowledge of philosophy of şeriat and hikmet-i cedide (implying both the observing of the nature 
and the society aspect of new philosophy)219 (Muh: 25). The crucial thing is that he seems to 
derive the classical age philosophers’ understanding of the necessity on formulation of principles 
of şeriat, at the same time implying the necessity of absorbtion of social sciences to reach a true 
understanding of the Koran. The solidification of this argument can be found in his approval to 
the legitimacy of non-Muslims to be governors in an Islamic state. He suggests that in meşrutiyet-
regime, they are the servants, not lords of the people. And a non-Muslim can be a servant to the 
Muslims220 (Mün: 79). In this example, the social situation is determined through an absolutely 
pre-religious thought: governors are servants of the nation. Then, the ethical decision based on 
this ‘social fact.’  
                                                 
218 Şeriat-ı Garra Kelam-ı Ezeliden geldiğinden ebede gidecektir. Zira şecere-i meylü’l-istikmal-i 
alemin dalı olan insandaki meylü’t-terakkinin mahsul ve semeresi olan istidadın telahuk-u efkarla 
hasıl olan netaicinin teşerrüb ve tegaddi ile büyümesi nisbetinde Şeriat-ı Garra aynen maddi 
zihayat gibi tevessü ve intibak edeceğinden ezelden gelip ebede gideceğine bürhan-ı bahirdir.  
 
219 (Kur’an’ın anlaşılmasında), Hadd-i evsatı gösterecek, ifrat ve tefriti kıracak yalnız felsefe-i 
şeriatle belagat ve mantık ve hikmettir. Evet, hikmet derim, çünkü hayr-ı kesirdir. Şerri vardır; 
fakat cüz’idir. 
220 . Sual: Şimdi Ermeniler kaymakam ve vali oluyorlar; nasıl olur? 
Cevap: Saatçi ve makineci ve süpürgeci oldukları gibi. Zira meşrutiyet, hakimiyet-i millettir; 
hükumet hizmetkardır. Meşrutiyet doğru olursa, kaymakam ve vali reis değiller, belki ücretli 
hizmetkarlardır. 
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The search for rationality is evident in three other occasions: with other implications, 
Bediüzzaman claims that forbidden sculpture is a solidified tyranny, a materialized lust or an 
embodied hypocrisy221 (HŞ: 109). This search for rationality in fact re-determines the place of 
sculpture in a possible Islamic art. Without these characteristics, sculpture is legitimate. In his 
answer to the objections to him against his claim that Muslims should be friendly towards the 
non-Muslims, he seeks for the rationality of the Koranic verse forbidding such a relation and 
opens a free realm for his idea222 (Mün: 70-1). Bediüzzaman insists on the necessity to forbid 
usury. However, his argumentation is not a religious but secular one. Interest system as a whole 
mainly serves to the most evil classes in the world. What is significant is, he implies that welfare 
of humanity peaceful with Muslims (as a maslahat/public interest) can be taken as a basis of 
thought223 (HŞ: 111). 
In fact, dependence on the rationality of the Scripture is manifested in  Kürdi’s 
assumption on the process of revelation in history. In his striking text, Kürdi suggests that the 
issues of Şeriat can be categorized into two areas. First some of the principles of Islam are 
absolutely established by Şeriat. The second realm comprises the issues that Şeriat reformed the 
Bedouin Arab society in the limits of their nature. Bediüzzaman claims, the first category is 
absolutely good, and the second category is delegated to the Muslims having the duty to improve 
the social conditions, as in the examples of slavery and women’s status in the society. What is 
                                                 
221 Memnu heykel, ya bir zulm-ü mütehaccir, ya bir heves-i mütecessim veya bir riya-yı 
mütecessittir.  
222 Sual: Yahudi ve Nasara ile muhabetten Kur’an’da nehiy vardır: “La tettehizu’l-yahuda ve’n-
nasara evliya” (Yahudileri ve Hrıstiyanları dost edinmeyin).  
Bununla beraber nasıl ‘Dost olunuz!’ dersiniz? 
Cevap: Evvela: ... 
Saniyen: Zaman-ı Saadette bir inkılab-ı azim-i dini vücuda geldi. Bütün ezhanı nokta-i dine 
çevirdiğinden, bütün muhabbet ve adaveti o noktada toplayıp muhabbet ve adavet ederlerdi. 
Onun için, gayr-i müslimlere olan muhabbetten nifak kokusu geliyordu. Lakin, şimdi alemdeki, 
bir inkılab-ı acib-i medeni ve dünyevidir. Bütün ezhanı zapt ve bütün ukulu meşgul eden nokta-i 
medeniyet, terakki ve dünyadır...Binaenaleyh, onlarla dost olmamız, medeniyet ve terakkilerini 
istihsan ile iktibas etmektir ve her saadet-i dünyeviyenin esası olan asayişi muhafazadır. İşte şu 
dostluk, katiyen nehy-i Kur’anide dahil değildir. 
223 Ribanın kap ve kapıları olan bankaların nef’i, beşerin fenası olan gavurlara ve onların en 
zalimlerine ve bunların en sefihlerinedir. Alem-i İslam’a zarar-ı mutlaktır; mutlak beşerin refahı 
nazara alınmaz. Zira gavur harbi ve mütecaviz ise, hürmetsiz ve ismetsizdir.  
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crucial is even though he supported polygamy, he supported it through mentioning reason224 (Tul: 
198). As a matter of fıkıh methodology, this classification can play an axial role in the 
development of understanding of Şeriat due to the fact that there is no clear historical distinction 
between what Şeriat had established and what it had reformed. 
 
B. CONDITIONALITY AND HISTORICITY OF THE DIVINE VERDICTS 
The existential distinction between what the Şeriat did establish and what did reform 
brings us to the consciousness of historicity and conditionality in Bediüzzaman. This is apparent 
in Kürdi’s argumentation on friendship with non-Muslims. In the Prophet’s time, social relations 
were based on religion, but in the modern age it is based on material life. Kürdi’s understanding 
of holy war (cihad) is in the same manner. War with weapons is legitimate in the age of 
primitivity to break the bigotry of the infidels, but in the age of humanism, cihad should be war 
with words, by showing rational proofs. In this effort a civilized life is essential which requires 
material development. Then the enemy is not the non-Muslims who are civilized but the enemy is 
ignorance, poverty and inner fragmentation225 (DHÖ: 47,48, 76-77).  
                                                 
224 S- Teaddüd-ü zevcat ve abd gibi bazı mesaili, ecnebiler serrişte ederek medeniyet nokta-i 
nazarında, Şeriat’a bazı evham ve şübehatı irad ediyorlar. 
C- İslamiyetin ahkamı iki kısımdır.  
Birincisi: Şeriat ona müessesdir. Bu ise, hüsn-ü hakiki ve hayr-ı mahzdır.  
Birisi dahi: Şeriat muaddildir. Yani gayet vahşi ve gaddar bir suretten çıkarıp, ehvenü’ş-şer ve 
muaddel ve tabiat-ı beşere tatbiki mümkün ve tamamen hüsn-ü hakikiyeye geçebilmek için 
zaman ve zeminden alınmış bir surete ifrağ etmiştir. Çünkü, birden tabiat-ı beşerde umumen 
hükümferma olan bir emri, birden ref’etmek, tabiat-ı beşeri birden kalbetmek iktiza eder.  
Binaenaleyh, Şeriat vazı-ı esaret değildir. Belki en vahşi bir suretten, böyle tamamen hürriyete 
yol açacak ve geçebilecek bir surete indirmiştir, tadil etmiştir.  
Hem de dörde (1) kadar teaddüd-ü zevcat, tabiata, akla, hikmete muvafakatıyla beraber Şeriat, bir 
taneden dörde çıkarmamış, belki sekizden, dokuzdan dörde indirmiştir. Bahusus taaddüde öyle 
şerait koymuştur ki, ona müraat etmekle hiçbir mazarrata müeddi olmaz. Bazı noktada şer olsa 
da, ehvenü’ş-şerdir. Ehvenü’ş-şer ise, bir adalet-i izafiyedir.  
Heyhat! Alemin her halinde hayr-ı mahz olmaz . 
225 (Bu ittihad-ı Muhammedi’nin) kılınçları da, berahin-i katıadır. Zira medenilere galebe çalmak 
ikna iledir, icbarla değil. Taharri-i hakikat, muhabbet iledir. Husumet ise: vahşet ve taassuba karşı 
idi.  
Ecnebiler fünun ve sanayi silahıyla bizi istibdat-ı manevileri altında eziyorlar. Biz de fen ve sanat 
silahıyla i’la-yı Kelimetullah’ın en müthiş düşmanı olan cehil ve fakr ve ihtilaf-ı efkarla cihad 
edeceğiz.  
Amma cihad-ı hariciyi Şeriat-ı garranın berahin-i katıasının elmas kılınçlarına havale edeceğiz.   
İ’la-yı Kelimetullahın bu zamanda en büyük sebebi, maddeten terakki etmektir. 
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The understanding of conditionality necessarily follows the idea that the Muslims in the 
same age with different social and existential backgrounds would grasp the Islamic reality 
different from each other. For Kürdi, this is completely legitimate. Even though he is a sincere 
Ehl-i Sünnet believer, he says that different ideas as far as they are in relation to the truth 
(hakikat) are limited aspects of the same Unity, thus they deserve to exist. But in two conditions: 
the proponents of these doctrines should not accuse other groups as they are mistaken; and 
secondly, the truth in their doctrines should shape their supporters, not the desires of these 
individuals to degenerate the doctrines226 (Tul: 187-8). 
The extreme conception of conditionality is stated in the description of Koranic verses on 
benevolence (salihat). He says that as benevolence is extremely relativistic, Koran’s universality 
necessitates to undetermine it227 (Sün: 142). The extreme assertion of historicity of the Şeriat is 
the idea that Time being the greatest Commentator of the Koran. For that reason, he suggests that 
under the guidance of Time, experts on all intellectual disciplines, implying the experts of natural 
and social sciences, should write a Koranic exegesis228 (Muh: 21) 
                                                 
226. Sual: Alem-i İslam ulemasının ortasındaki müdhiş ihtilafata ne dersin ve rey’in nedir? 
Cevap: Evvela: (1) Alem-i İslam’a gayr-ı muntazam ve intizamı bozulmuş bir meclis-i meb’usan 
ve encümen-i şura nazarı ile bakıyorum. Şeriat’tan işitiyoruz ki, “re’y-i cumhur budur, fetva 
bunun üzerinedir.”  
İşte şu, bu meclisteki re’y, ekseriyetin nazariyesidir. Re’y-i cumhurdan maada olan akval, eğer 
hakikat ve mağz’dan hali ve boş olmazsa, istidadatın re’ylerine bırakılır. Ta herbir istidat 
terbiyesine münasib gördüğünü intihab etsin. 
Lakin burada iki nokta-i mühimme vardır:  
Birincisi: Şu istidadatın meyelanı ile intihab olunan ve bir derece hakikatı tazammun eden ve 
ekalliyette kalan kavl, nefsü’l-emirde mukayyed ve o istidat ile mahsus olduğu halde, sahibi 
ihmal edip mutlak bıraktı; etbaı iltizam edip tamim etti. Mukallitleri taassub edip, o kavlin hıfzı 
için muhaliflerin red ve hedmine çalıştılar... 
İkinci nokta: Ekalliyette kalan kavl eğer içindeki hakikat ve mağz, onu intihab eden istidatlardaki 
heves ve heva ve mevrus aynaya ve mizacına galebe çalmazsa, o kavl bir hatar-ı azimde kalır. 
Zira istidat onunla insibağ edip, onun muktezasına inkılp etmek lazım iken, o onu kendine çevirir 
ve telkih eder, kendi emrine musahhar eder. İşte şu noktadan hüda hevaya tahavvül ve mezhep 
mizaçtan teşerrüb eder. Arı su içer bal akıtır. Yılan su içer zehir döker  
227Kur’an salihatı mutlak, mübhem bırakıyor. Çünki ahlak ve faziletler hüsn ve hayr çoğu 
nisbidirler. Neviden nev’e geçtikçe değişir. Sınıftan sınıfa nazil oldukça ayrılır. Mahalden 
mahalle, tebdil-i mekan ettikçe başkalaşır. Cihet muhtelif olsa, muhtelif olur. Ferdden cemaate, 
şahıstan millete çıktıkça mahiyeti değişir.  
228Her zamanın bir hükmü var. Zaman dahi bir müfessirdir...Müfessir-i azim olan zamanın tahtı 
riyasetinde, her biri bir fende mütehassıs, muhakkikin-i ulemadan müntehab bir meclis-i 
meb’usan-ı ilmiye teşkili ile meşveret ile bir tefsiri telif etmek... 
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His understanding of Time as a Koranic commentator is underlined in his answer to the 
problem of friendship with non-Muslims. The first aspect of this answer was mentioned above. 
Second aspect deals with literary Koranic exegesis which shows how Time shapes the 
understanding of the Koran. Here he works on the words of the Scripture, shows an alternative 
meaning excerpted from the text itself and claims that Time (implying the modern age) shows the 
restriction of the meaning of the verse which is in itself unrestricted229 (Mün: 70-1). 
 
C. TELOS AND HOLISM IN THE RELIGIOUS VERDICTS 
Rationality, historicity and conditionality are the components of the holistic view of the 
Şeriat, having a telos. This telos dimension determines the dynamism of the Şeriat due to the fact 
that social reality does always change, and to preserve the telos, appearance of the Şeriat should 
always change. From his social theory, it can be derived that the telos of the Şeriat, according to 
Bediüzzaman, is to provide the existential requirements for the humankind to reach the stage of 
the caliphate of God on Earth. This has two dimensions. Remembering the section on civilization, 
it can be said that the telos of the Şeriat is deeply in contact with the spiritual desires of mankind 
(hüda) by controlling bodily ones (heva and heves). This is the position which is meaningful in 
the sense that God gave a mission to humankind: to apply His rule in the universe (hüda) and not 
to obey to Satan (heves). However, the more important aspect of the telos of the Şeriat in the 
understanding of Kürdi is his integration of a deeply modern concept into the idea of caliphate of 
God: freedom. For him, only really free individuals can be true caliphs of God. Only the man free 
from people and free from his ego can be a true slave of God, meaning the caliph of God.  
There are three implications on freedom’s position as a telos of the Şeriat. Firstly, as I 
quoted, Kürdi portraits the history of humanity as such: humankind brought oppression (istibdat) 
from their existence as animals. And the Şeriat was revealed in order to clean this dirt.230 In this 
                                                 
229Sual: Yahudi ve Nasara ile muhabetten Kur’an’da nehiy vardır: “La tettehizu’l-yahuda ve’n-
nasara evliya” (Yahudileri ve Hrıstiyanları dost edinmeyin).  
Bununla beraber nasıl ‘Dost olunuz!’ dersiniz? 
Cevap: Evvela: Delil katiü’l-metin olduğu gibi, katiü’delalet olmak gerektir. Halbuki tevil ve 
ihtimalin mecali vardır. Zira, nehy-i Kur’ani amm değildir, mutlaktır. Mutlak ise takyid 
olunabilir. Zaman bir büyük müfessirdir; kaydını izhar etse, itiraz olunmaz. Hem de hüküm 
müştak üzerine olsa, me’haz-ı iştikakı illet-i hüküm gösterir. Demek bu nehiy, Yahudi Nasara ile 
Yahudiyet ve Nasraniyet olan ayinleri hasebiyledir.... 
230 Sual: Şu pis istibdat ne vakitten beri başlamış geliyor? 
Cevap: İnsanlar hayvanlıktan çıkıp geldiği vakit, nasılsa bunu da beraber getirmiştir. 
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aspect, in another text that I have quoted, Kürdi says in the realm of the Şeriat had reformed the 
society, it opened a way for true freedom for the Muslims: a path which the Muslims should 
follow and perfect the Şeriat231 (Tul: 198). These statements in fact serve to the 
transcendentalization of the concept of hürriyet. The manifestation of the transcendental nature of 
freedom is as follows: Şeriat has come to universe in order to  destroy oppression232 (DHÖ: 86). 
The issue of hüda is implied in several places in the thesis. Especially on fıkıh, 
Bediüzzaman’s idea on the condition of legitimacy of içtihad is crucial. He asserts that içtihad is 
legitimate and demandable if it is performed by a sincere Muslim who internalized Islamic values 
deeply. However, the içtihad of the one who is indifferent (lakayt) to Islamic values would 
degenerate Islam233 (HŞ: 109). The significant distinction between the two is not what they say 
but in which position they speak. 
Holism is a natural outcome of what has been said up to now. I want to give an example 
where Bediüzzaman both reveals his understanding of hüda and his holistic approach. There are 
many Koranic verses and Prophetic traditions on the problem of music. The classical age fıkıh 
with their particularistic understanding of religious sources produced içtihads too much 
complicated and detailed which can be found in any ilmihal book. How Kürdi approaches to the 
question is determining the issue with regard to the telos (hüda) and unify all the statements in 
the Scripture: if music gives mundane pleasure or desperation it should be forbidden, but if it 
gives a spiritual pleasure or a Koranic sadness it is legitimate. What he adds is, it depends on 
individual’s feeling. No general restriction can be put234 (RNK 1: 339).  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
…Sual: Sonra? 
Cevap: Şeriat-ı Garra zemine nüzul etti; ta ki, zeminin yüzünü temiz ve insaniyetin yüzünü ak 
etsin, şu insaniyetten siyah lekesini izale etsin.     
231 Binaenaleyh, Şeriat vazı-ı esaret değildir. Belki en vahşi bir suretten, böyle tamamen hürriyete 
yol açacak ve geçebilecek bir surete indirmiştir, tadil etmiştir.  
232 Şeriat aleme gelmiş ta istibdadı ve tahakkümü mahvetsin.  
233 İslamiyetin müselematını tamamen imtisal ettiği cihetle bihakkın daire-i dahiline girmiş zatta, 
meyl’t-tevsi, meylü’t-tekemmüldür. Lakaytlıkla hariçte sayılan zatta, meylü’t-tevsi, meylü’t-
tahribdir. 
234 Bazı alat-ı lehvi tahrim edip, bir kısmı helal diye izin verip; demek hüzn-ü Kur’ani veya şevk-i 
tenzili veren alet zarar vermez.  
Eğer hüznü-ü yetimi veya şevk-i nefsani verse alet haramdır. Değişir eşhasa göre; herkes 
birbirine benzemez. 
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D. THE POSITION OF THE WORD OF THE SCRIPTURE IN THE ŞERİAT 
Any reconstruction of Islamic fıkıh should face the problem of the restrictive role of the 
Koranic text. First of all, the specific issues mentioned in the Koran, generally binds the 
reformation process. The second imposition on the reformer is the unbreakable authority of the 
past masters (selef). Bediüzzaman solved the first problem by claiming that all of the Koran’s 
statements are general but not specific, and responded to the second problematic by claiming that 
the works of the selef should be read only in order to understand the Koran. They have no binding 
authority even though they deserve great respect. 
He first reinterprets the statements of the Koran. He says that  there are some verses 
which are open to be restricted but supposed to be universal. Some are valid for a certain time but 
assumed to be permanent, and some are restricted but conceived as general235 (Sün: 149). 
Secondly, he claims that the nature of the Koran suggests multiple meanings all of which are 
legitimate236 (Rum: 227). Thirdly, he states that the nature of the Koran as God’s word is 
essentially general in every way, thus it is possible to legitimize all meanings attributed to its 
verses which as essentially deliberately connoted by God237 (İİ: 6). This implies that a choice 
                                                 
235 Bazı ayat ve ehadis vardır ki, mutlakadır. Külliye telakki edilmiş. Hem öyleler vardır ki, 
münteşire-i muvakkatadır. Daime zannedilmiş. Hem mukayyed var. Amm hesab edilmiş. 
236. Eğer desen: “(Senin Kur’an tasvirinden) anlaşılır ki, teaddüd-ü mesalik ve ihtilaf-ı turuk 
matlubdur.” 
Cevap: Evet matlubdur. Hem zaruridir. Eğer hodgamlıktan neş’et eden inhisar zihniyetiyle 
başkaların reddine kalkışırsa (Allah için nefret)’i su-i istimal ederse, o vakit ihtilaf zarardır.Yoksa 
(Allah için sevmek) düsturunu esas tutsa, tekamülde teavün kanunu bilse Şeriat’ın vüs’atını, 
tabipliğini düşünse, ihtilaf imtizaca sebep olur.  
237 . Birincisi: Madem Kur’an, Kelamullahtır; umum asırlar üzerinde ve arkasında oturan muhtelif 
tabaka tabaka olarak dizilmiş bütün nev-i beşere hitap ediyor, ders veriyor, hem bu kainatın 
Halik-i Zülcelalinin kelamı olarak Rububiyetin en yüksek mertebesinden çıkıp bu binler muhtelif 
tabaka muhataplarla konuşuyor, umumunun bütün suallerine ve ihtiyaçlarına cevap veriyor; 
elbette manaları külli ve umumidir. Beşer kelamı gibi mahsus bir zamana, muayyen bir taifeye ve 
cüz’i bir manaya inhisar etmiyor. Bütün cin ve insin binler muhtelif tabakada olan efkar ve ukul 
ve kulub ve ervahının herbirisine layık gıdaları veriyor, dağıtıyor... 
İkincisi: Kelam-ı Ezeliden gelen ve bütün asırları ve bütün tavaif-i nev-i beşeri muhatap ittihaz 
eden Kur’an-ı Hakimin gayet külli manalarının, cevherlerinin sadefi hükmünde olan lafz-ı 
Kur’ani elbette küllidir (İİ: 5) 
...Bu sebepten, bütün tefsirlerde görünen ve sarahat, işaret, remiz, ima, telvih, telmih gibi 
tabakalarla müfessirinin beyan ettikleri manalar, kavaid-i Arabiyeye ve usul-ü nahve ve usul-ü 
dine muhalif olmamak şartıyla, o manalar, o kelamdan bizzat muraddır, maksuddur. 
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from alternative meanings of Koran is always legitimate: a situation that emancipates the 
Muslim.  
On the second question, with his deep respect to the past masters, he shakes their 
authority politely by asserting that only the Koran has the religious authority. And gradually the 
works of the selef should be linked to the Koran238 (Sün: 158-9). What is significant is that he 
believes that in the future new generations with their own ideas will enter into a dialogue with the 
works of the selef in their understanding of Islam.  In this process, the Prophetic Sunna is also 
posited in its relation to the Koran. It is not a second authority but is the interpretation of Koran239 
(Sün: 157). 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Bediüzzaman in his formulation of fıkıh methodology reached to a reflexive 
understanding of the Şeriat. It is the humankind who has a pre-religious rationality as well as 
conscience which thinks on Revelation. It is the humankind with his reason and conscience who 
tries to find out the telos of the Şeriat which is not given a priori. And it is the human being who 
reinterprets the Şeriat according to the telos he had find out through contemplation on a social 
thought. This situation, through giving a rationality to the ethical realm signifies modernity of 
Bediüzzaman Said-i Kürdi in that aspect.    
  As far as ethics is not determined by the Scripture per se, but through the reflective reason 
relating social thought to fıkıh inifinitely, and as the ‘rational’ meaning of the totality of the 
Scripture is the main determinant more than the particularist literal interpretation of it, (even 
though Kürdi insisted on its aspect as a literal miracle), the Muslim defined by Bediüzzaman can 
legitimately enter into a dialogue with non-Muslim segments on the ethical dimension of life. 
This seems to be a call for creation of a ‘public space’ with a religious motivation. 
                                                 
238 Demek Şeriat kitapları, birer şeffaf cam mahiyetinde olmak lazım gelirken, mürur-u zamanla 
mukallidlerin hatası yüzünden paslanıp, hicab olmuşlardır. Evet bu kitaplar, Kur’an’a tefsir 
olmak lazım iken başlı başına tasnifat hükmüne geçmişlerdir. 
Tedrici bir terbiye-i mahsusa ile kütüb-ü Şeriatı şeffaf birer tefsir suretine çevirip, içinde Kur’an’ı 
göstermek (lazım)... Bir adam İbn-i Hacer’e nazar ettiği vakit, Kur’an’ı anlamak ve Kur’an’ın ne 
dediğini öğrenmek maksadiyle nazar etmeli. Yoksa İbn-i Hacer’in ne dediğini anlamak 
maksadiyle değil).        
239 Erkan ve ahkam-ı zaruriye ki, yüzde doksandır. Bizzat Kur’an’ın ve Kur’an’ın tefsiri 
mahiyetinde olan sünnetin malıdır. İçtihadi olan mesail-i hilafiye ise, yüzde on nisbetindedir. 
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  CONCLUSION: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If my thesis gave an understanding of the real achievement of Bediüzzaman Said-i Kürdi, 
it has reached its purpose. An evaluation of this achievement is as follows:  
 The Muslims of the modern era had an ideological legacy that impeded any development 
in responding to a profoundly different vision of world: modernity which seeks continuous 
response to change. This legacy was efficient in a medieval society whose unity was possible 
only through dependence on the Scripture; but it became a problem for the era which was 
alienated from the strict obedience to God’s volition reflected in different particular ways in the 
Scripture. The solution of Bediüzzaman to this problem was to formulate a holistic and dynamic 
view of the Şeriat whose telos exists in the nature of human being: freedom. In other words, as 
far as freedom is essentially linked with true prayer for God, Bediüzzaman transcends the 
dichotomy between the Mundane and the Transcendental. Neither of them is rejected for the sake 
of the other.  
 In this formulation, the urgent need that Bediüzzaman concerns is to respond the 
modernization process accurately. In this sense, the methodology of Islamic law he developed 
was a social fıkıh. What I mean is, it is a social thought that defines the social reality, rather than 
the religious concerns to construct reality. This necessitated Bediüzzaman to theorize social 
sciences as a necessary component in developing an Islamic legal system and ethics. The relation 
between ideals and realities in Kürdi can be formulated through the relation between form and 
content. As far as he conceives the Scripture and its verdicts as universal but not particular, the 
total understanding of the Scripture becomes a form which is assumed to shape the social-real 
content.  
 This understanding is especially significant in Bediüzzaman’s insistence upon the 
‘meaning’ of the Scripture more than its linguistic horizon. It is the ‘meaning’ that creates an 
historical and conditional dimension to the understanding of fıkıh. It is the ‘meaning’ that paves 
way for seeking rationality in Islamic law and through this, gives a chance to transcend the 
modern alienation from God’s volition.  
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 In this effort, Bediüzzaman is not isolated from history. In fact, my study suggests that the 
roots of his ideas in social theory and legal understanding can also be found in earlier responses 
to modernity. As I claimed, he started with 19th century Sufi reformism in his sensitivity to the 
social life, and he achieved an established synthesis of the Turkish modernization project and the 
Islamic reform movements of the 19th century. However, his purpose was radically different from 
these traditions. Whereas Turkish modernization project remained loyal to the incentive of 
securing the Empire throughout the decades, and whereas the 19th century Islamic reform 
movements either seeked for religious purity or for responding modernity in a theoretically 
defensive way, Bediüzzaman seems to have tried to work for future generations: he established 
an ethical basis for the coming glory Islamic civilization.  
 This attempt centralizes ‘civilization’ in his understanding of social thought and ethics. 
The impact of the Enlightenment on Kürdi is obvious in this conception. It is universal as an 
ideal. In this sense, the Western civilization is seen as a carrier of true civilization in significant 
aspects: sciences, arts and humanism. This dimension necessitates a friendly dialogue with the 
West rather than a clash of civilizations. His statements on the evil side of Western civilization 
does not depend on the civilization-in-itself (i.e. humanism, sciences and arts), but on the 
domination of anti-civilizational dimensions (the dominance of pre-human attributes in the 
Western civilization: i.e. lust and power not restrained by reason) and  within the Western 
civilization: power and mundane pleasure which are constructed by materialist philosophy.  
 This presentation brings two approaches: firstly, for Kürdi, philosophy and reason in itself 
and in relation to God is beneficial to the society. What is problematic in Western materialism is, 
in Kürdi’s view, determination of Western reason by uncontrolled power and lust; both of whom 
preventing reason to reach its natural conclusion as God’s unity and enter the realm of conscience 
and heart. However, a philosophy and reason open to the Transcendental, which exists in the 
essence of Islam, would create a different social implication. It would be the triumph of justice 
and truth rather than power, and the triumph of spiritual desires not neglecting worldly pleasure 
but not limited to it. 
Related with this, the second approach comes from human being’s ontological situation as 
God’s slave. Freedom gains its meaning with this idea. In Bediüzzaman, freedom does not mean 
anything to do what one desires to do; he is responsible to God. In this sense, freedom is possible 
only through acceptance of this responsibility. Only the unification of these two concepts brings 
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the true existence of human being: to be the caliph of God on Earth. The responsibility of the 
caliph is to cultivate the world in all sense in the name of God. 
 It should be obvious that this conception of civilization is essentially linked with the Sufi 
understandings of existence and ontology. He seems to have been internalize this dimension in 
his childhood and expanded its realm during his further intellectual formation. In the period that I 
analyzed he mainly dealt with the urgent social problems of the Empire, with this formulation in 
his mind. But during his remaining life in the times of the Turkish Republic (1923-1960), when 
he took the name of Said Nursi, he seems to have conceived that the essence of this formulation 
is under threat. This threat necessitated a restructuration of the ontological and existential basis of 
the Islamic action. He was fully aware that he would not see the worldly fruits of his struggle, but 
as a believer the accomplishment of his task would return to him in the afterworld.  
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